


Peddling Power

Part 6




UA Flight 93




Ziad Jarrah
PILOT (16)

Full Name: Ziad Samir Jarrah
Date Arrived in US: 27 June 2000
Arrival City in US: Newark, NJ
Nationality: Lebanese
Residence in US: Florida
DOB: 11 May 1975 (26 years old)




Ahmad al-Nami
(17)

Full Name: Ahmad Abdullah Abd al-Rahman al-Nami
Date Arrived in US: 28 May 2001
Arrival City in US: Miami, FL
Nationality: Saudi
Residence in US: Florida
DOB: 7 Dec 1977 (23 years old)



Ahmad al-Haznawi
(18)

Full Name: Ahmad Ibrahim Ali al-Haznawi
Date Arrived in US: 8 June 2001
Arrival City in US: Miami, FL
Nationality: Saudi
Residence in US: Florida
DOB: 11 Oct 1980 (20 years old)



Said al-Ghamdi
(19)

Full Name: Said Abdalah Ali Suleyman al-Ghamdi
Date Arrived in US: 27 June 2001
Arrival City in US: Orlando, FL
Nationality: Saudi
Residence in US: Florida
DOB: 21 Nov 1979 (21 years old)

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A photograph of a United Airlines Boeing 757-222 aircraft in flight, showing the tail fin with the United logo and the fuselage with "UNITED AIRLINES" and "NEWARK" visible.

United Airlines 93 / Boeing 757-222 / Registration: N591UA

Flight UA93 departed from Newark Liberty Airport at 08:42:48 a.m. according to the FAA. (Sheet 1.) The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) revised their initial timeline for Flight UA93, having the aircraft takeoff from Newark airport after a 41 minute delay, which would later coincide with the FBI’s timeline.

FAA Report

Sheet 1.

| United Airlines 93 Timeline | | | |
|---|--------------|--------------|---|
| Time (EDT) | From | To | Event |
| Note: Times are tape-based. Times on tapes and certified transcripts do not always jibe | | | |
| 7:50:05 | UA93 | Newark Tower | UA93 reports to clearance delivery squawking 1527 |
| 7:50:10 | Newark Tower | UA93 | Delays off the airport less than one five minutes |
| 8:09:20 | Newark Tower | UA93 | UA93 directed to runway 4L |
| 8:40:31 | Newark Tower | UA93 | Taxi into position and hold 4L |
| 8:41:53 | Newark Tower | UA93 | Cleared for take off 4L |
| 8:42:48 | Radar | | Takeoff |

¹ [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml]

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Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)
Flight UA93 – September 11, 2001

Sheet 2.

| Detailed Statistics - Departures | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| Airport: New York-New Jersey-Lang Island, NY-LI-PA - Newark Liberty International (EWR) | | | | | | | | | |
| Airline: United Airlines (UA) | | | | | | | | | |
| Month(s): September | | | | | | | | | |
| Day(s): 11 | | | | | | | | | |
| Year(s): 2001 | | | | | | | | | |
| NOTE: A complete listing of airline and airport abbreviations is available. Times are reported in local time using a 24 hour clock. | | | | | | | | | |
| Carrier Code | Date (MM/DD/YYYY) | Flight Number | Tail Number | Destination Airport | Scheduled Departure Time | Actual Departure Time | Scheduled Elapsed Time (Minutes) | Actual Elapsed Time (Minutes) | |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 31 UNKNOWN | DEH | | 11:30 | 00:00 | 240 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 75 UNKNOWN | SFO | | 14:30 | 00:00 | 359 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 77 UNKNOWN | SFO | | 19:20 | 00:00 | 371 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 79 UNKNOWN | SFO | | 17:30 | 00:00 | 371 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 81 N509UA | SFO | | 07:00 | 06:56 | 370 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 83 N422UA | LAX | | 07:00 | 06:54 | 355 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 85 UNKNOWN | LAX | | 12:20 | 00:00 | 340 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 87 UNKNOWN | LAX | | 18:00 | 00:00 | 356 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 89 UNKNOWN | LAX | | 15:20 | 00:00 | 343 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 91 UNKNOWN | SFO | | 09:20 | 00:00 | 374 | 0 | 0 |
| UA | 09/11/2001 | 93 N591UA | SFO | | 08:00 | 08:01 | 374 | 0 | 1 |

Sheet 3.

| Departure Delay (Minutes) | Wheels-off Time | Taxi-out Time (Minutes) | Delay Carrier (Minutes) | Delay Weather (Minutes) | Delay National Aviation System (Minutes) | Delay Security (Minutes) | Departure Delay (Minutes) |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 00:00 | | | 0 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| 0 00:00 | | | 0 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| 0 00:00 | | | 0 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| 0 00:00 | | | 0 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| -4 07:13 | | | 17 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | -4 |
| -6 07:20 | | | 26 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | -6 |
| 0 00:00 | | | 0 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| 0 00:00 | | | 0 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| 0 00:00 | | | 0 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| 0 00:00 | | | 0 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| 1 08:28 | | | 27 N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 1 |

In sheet 2 above, the aircraft was supposed to depart at 08:00 a.m. with a 1 minute departure delay. A further 374 minutes was scheduled to elapse before departure; this would mean the aircraft would take off within a 6 hour and 14 minute time frame to leave at 14:14 p.m. In sheet 3 the aircraft had a 1 minute delay; taxied for 27 minutes then took off at 08:28 a.m. and not at 08:42:48 a.m. as the initial FAA report shows in Sheet 1. It is important to keep these two timelines in mind, as we unfold the events for Flight UA93.

| BTS | FAA | FBI | 9/11 Commission |
|------------|---------------|------------|---------------------------|
| 08:28 a.m. | 08:42:48 a.m. | 08:42 a.m. | 08:42 a.m. <i>Revised</i> |

14 minutes and 48 seconds difference

On September 12, 2001, the FBI received a list of boarding passes, which was released on April 2, 2004. The list recorded 38 passengers who passed through gate 17 (terminal A) at Newark International Airport. However, the agency distinctly notes how the list does not contain any “conclusions” coming from the FBI, since the list was provided by the United Airline General Manager of Customer Service, Mr. Teresa A. Rizzuto.

The 9/11 Commission requested a questionnaire interview with the airline company (United Airlines) on April 5, 2004. The questionnaires were filled in and the following information was given: Flight UA93 was originally booked for 40 passengers; ² however, only 37 passengers finally boarded the aircraft according to their report (#UASSI1-00000549). This will however contradict the boarding list (below) given to the FBI, because it depicts 38 boarding passes were

² #UASSI1-00000549; #UASSI1-00028256-28359; #UASSI1-00029101-103; #UASSI 1-00000062.

used. In addition, United Airlines' Airworthiness report at the end of this section states 45 fatalities. This final number would agree with 38 passengers (including 4 hijackers) and 7 crew members. The airline report (#UASSI1-00000549) differs from their boarding list.

BEGPRODNO : M-INT-00021713
BEGBATES : 265A-NY-280350-NK-744
DATE = 09/12/2001
FBIDESC : TERESA A. RIZZUTO; LIST OF 38 NAMES ON FLIGHT 93
INPUTBATCH : NCTA_004 (1st Batch of unredacted 302's delivered in August)
FULLTEXT : FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/12/2001

On 09/11/2001 United Airlines General Manager of Customer Service Teresa A. Rizzuto, provided the below listed Special Agent SA of the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI with the following items:

1. Thirty-eight 38 airline boarding passes used by passengers to board United Airlines flight ninety-three 93 on 09/11/2001 at Gate seventeen 17 of terminal A at Newark International Airport. The following 38 names appear on the boarding passes:

Ahmed Alnami
Ahmad Alhaznawi
Ziad Jarrah
Saeed Alghamdi
William Caghman
Mark Bingham
Edward Felt
Mark Rothenberg
Linda Gronlund
Thomas Burnett
Georgine Corrigan
Andrew Garcia
Jeremy Glick
Richard Guadagno
Honor Wainio
Patrick Driscoll
Marion itton partial last name
Waleska Martinez
Christian Adams
First Name Unknown Britton
Donald Greene
Christine nyder partial last name
Todd Beamer
TMR Kuge
Kristin Gould
Nicole Miller
John Talignani
Louis Nacke
Lauren Grandcolas

Investigation on 09/11/2001 at Newark, New Jersey

File # 265D-NY-280350 Date dictated 09/12/2001
t9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

Boarding List of Flight UA93 September 11, 2001

| # | Boarding list | FBI | Comment | Discrepancy |
|----|------------------------------|--------------------|---|--|
| 1 | Adams Christian | Adams Christian | Boarding pass given | |
| | Alghamdi Saeed | Alghamdi Saeed | 1. Hijacker Boarding pass given | |
| | Alhaznawi Ahmad | Alhaznawi Ahmed | 2. Hijacker Boarding pass given | First name different |
| | Alnami Ahmed | Alnami Ahmed | 3. Hijacker Boarding pass given | |
| | | Bay Lorraine | 1. Flight Attendant | |
| 2 | Beamer Todd | Beamer Todd | Made 4 calls Boarding pass given | |
| 3 | Beaven Alan | Beaven Alan | PENTTBOMB Case #265A-NY-280350-CG on August 11, 2003 Boarding pass given | Attorney at law for Herman, DeValerio, Pease & Tabacco. Two open cases: Sugar Company Inc., environmental crimes; file of notice against Section 1365 of the Clean Water Act. |
| 4 | Bingham Mark | Bingham Mark | Made 4 calls Boarding pass given | PENTTBOMB Case #265A-NY-280350-CG on August 11, 2003, state that no seat assignment was given to this passenger. He was the owner of The Bingham Group (public relation firm). |
| 5 | Bodley Deora | Bodley Deora | Boarding pass given | |
| 6 | ...itton Marion | Britton Marion | Made 3 calls Boarding pass given | Partial last name on boarding list. Was a registered nurse. Traveling on official government business to Automation Conference in San Francisco, with Waleska Martinez. |
| 7 | Britton (first name unknown) | Britton (extra) | Boarding pass given | First name unknown on boarding list |
| | | Bradshaw Sandra | 2. Flight Attendant Made 3 calls | |
| 8 | Burnett Thomas | Burnett Thomas Jr. | Made 3 calls to his wife, Deena Boarding pass given | Jr. not stated on boarding list |
| 9 | Caghman William | Cashman William | NO Boarding pass | Surname different |
| 10 | Corrigan Georgine | Corrigan Georgine | Boarding pass given | |
| 11 | Cushing Patricia | Cushing Patricia | Boarding pass given | |
| | | Dahl Jason | 3. Captain | |
| 12 | Deluca Joseph | DeLuca Joseph | Made 4 calls Boarding pass given | Surname different |
| 13 | Driscoll Patrick | Driscoll Patrick | Boarding pass given | |
| 14 | Felt Edward | Felt Edward | Made 1 call Boarding pass given | |
| 15 | Folger Jane | Folger Jane | Boarding pass given | |
| 16 | Fraser Colleen | Fraser Colleen | Boarding pass given | |

*Boarding List of Flight UA93
(Cont'd)*

| # | Boarding list | FBI | Comment | Discrepancy |
|-----|----------------------|------------------------|---|--|
| 17 | Garcia Andrew | Garcia Andrew | PENTTBOMB Case #265A-NY-280350-CG on August 11, 2003 Boarding pass given | Owner of CINCO Group Inc. Might have held a security clearance as a function of his work with Lockheed. CINCO Group reportedly held company clearance through NASCO. He served in the Air National Guard from 1961-1968. |
| 18 | Glick Jeremy | Glick Jeremy | Made 1 call Boarding pass given | |
| (?) | <i>Gould Kristin</i> | <i>NOT LISTED</i> | <i>Medical writer</i> Boarding pass given | <i>FBI does not have this name on their list but changes the name to: Olga Kristin White</i> |
| 19 | Grandcolas Lauren | Grandcolas Lauren | Made 8 calls Boarding pass given | |
| | | <i>Green Wanda</i> | <i>4. Flight Attendant</i> | |
| 20 | Greene Donald | Greene Donald | PENTTBOMB Case #265A-NY-280350-CG on August 11, 2003 Boarding pass given | Passenger was an FAA Certified Pilot. |
| 21 | Gronlund Linda | Gronlund Linda | Made 4 calls Boarding pass given | |
| 22 | Guadagno Richard | Guadagno Richard | Boarding pass given | |
| | | <i>Homer Jr. Leroy</i> | <i>5. First Officer</i> | |
| | <i>Jarrah Ziad</i> | <i>Jarrah Ziad</i> | <i>4. Hijacker</i> Boarding pass given | |
| 23 | Kuge TMR | Kuge Toshiya | Boarding pass given | Only initials for first name on boarding list |
| | | <i>Lyles CeeCee</i> | <i>6. Flight Attendant</i> <i>Made 2 calls</i> | |
| 24 | Marcin Hilda | Marcin Hildagard | Boarding pass given | Changed first name |
| 25 | Martinez Waleska | Martinez Waleska | Made 4 calls Boarding pass given | PENTTBOMB Case #265A-NY-280350-CG on August 11, 2003, state passenger had 3 aliases, was a Computer System Manager at U.S. Census Bureau |
| 26 | Miller Nicole | Miller Nicole | Boarding pass given | |
| 27 | Nacke Louis Jr. | Nacke Louis Jr. | Boarding pass given | Jr. not stated on boarding list. PENTTBOMB Case #265A-NY-280350-CG on August 11, 2003, states passenger had an alias name. |
| 28 | Peterson Donald | Peterson Donald | Boarding pass given | PENTTBOMB Case #265A-NY-280350-CG on August 11, 2003, state spouse (Jean) was also on Flight UA93. |
| 29 | Peterson Jean | Peterson Jean | Boarding pass given | |

*Boarding List of Flight UA93
(Cont'd)*

| # | Boarding list | FBI | Comment | Discrepancy |
|----|----------------------------|--------------------|--|---|
| | Peterson Janine K. (Alias) | NO | This passenger is only given by PENTTBOMB Case #265A-NY-280350-CG on August 11, 2003, under their alias name. <u>NO Boarding pass</u> | Criminal arrests (redacted) and is the identical passenger (Jean Peterson) spouse to Donald Peterson. |
| 30 | Rothenberg Mark | Rothenberg Mark | Boarding pass given | |
| 31 | ..nyder Christine | Snyder Christine | Boarding pass given | Partial last name on boarding list |
| 32 | Talignani John | Talignani John | Boarding pass given | Driver's license expired: Found at crash site |
| 33 | Wainio Honor | Wainio Honor | Made 3 calls Boarding pass given | |
| | | Welsh Deborah | 7. Flight Attendant | |
| 34 | | White Olga Kristin | <u>NO Boarding pass</u> | |



The boarding list records 34 passengers and 4 hijackers that passed through gate 17 (terminal A) at Newark International Airport: A total of 38 persons.

The FBI list records 4 hijackers, and 33 passengers (omitting passenger Kristin Gould) passing through gate 17 (Terminal A) at Newark International Airport: A total of 37 persons, with 8 persons' names either changed and/or added.

The flight's manifest, released on October 4, 2002, follows. The passenger Kristin Gould whose name was changed by the FBI to Olga Kristin White is listed on the manifest in seat 21C.

Flight Manifest of Flight UA93 September 11, 2001

OCT. 4.2002 11:51AM

NO.213 P.2/3

OK WNNRUA
XIDRNUA 130040 IDBU
UA 93 11SEP EWR CKT IN CTVE UE/NRPS 9 F 20 Y

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---|-----|------|-----|---|----|----|
| 1. ADAMS | C | SFO | YK** | 17D | A | B | S |
| 2. ALGHAMDI | S | SFO | FF** | 30 | A | ET | B |
| 3. ALHAZNAWA | A | SFO | FF** | 68 | A | B | S |
| 4. ALNAMI | A | SFO | FF** | 09C | A | ET | B |
| 5. BEAMER | T | SFO | YB** | 10D | A | ET | M |
| 6. BEAVEN | A | SFO | YX** | 17F | A | ET | BM |
| 7. BRITTON | E | SFO | YY** | 12C | A | B | S |
| 8. BRITTON | M | SFO | YY** | 12B | A | B | S |
| 9. CASHMAN | W | SFO | YX** | 02 | A | ET | B |
| 10. CUSHING | P | SFO | YS** | 19C | A | B | S |
| 11. CORRIGAN | G | SFO | YW** | 12D | A | BM | 0 |
| 12. RODLEY | D | SFO | YX** | 20F | A | ET | B |
| 13. BURNETT | T | SFO | FN** | 04B | A | ET | M* |
| 14. DELUCA | J | SFO | XF** | 02B | A | B | S |
| 15. DRISCOLL | F | SFO | YX** | 15C | A | ET | BM |
| 16. FOLGER | J | SFO | YS** | 19B | A | B | S |
| 17. FRASER | C | SFO | YW** | 13A | A | B | S |
| 18. GARCIA | A | SFO | YX** | 20C | A | ET | BM |
| 19. FELT | E | SFO | FN** | 02D | A | ET | M* |
| 20. GOULD | K | SFO | YW** | 21C | A | B | S |
| 21. GREENE | D | SFO | YW** | 16D | A | BM | 0 |
| 22. GRONLUND | L | SFO | XF** | 02A | A | BM | 0 |
| 23. GUADAGNO | R | SFO | YV** | 19A | A | ET | BM |
| 24. GLICK | J | SFO | YK** | 11A | A | ET | M |
| 25. BRANDOLINI | L | SFO | YX** | 11D | A | ET | M |
| 26. JARRAH | Z | SFO | FF** | 01B | A | ET | B |
| 27. KUGE | T | SFO | YL** | 18A | A | ET | M |
| 28. MARCIN | H | SFO | YT** | 17C | A | ET | BM |
| 29. MARTINEZ | W | SFO | YY** | 10F | A | B | S |
| 30. PETERSON | J | SFO | YW** | 14C | A | ET | BM |
| 31. MILLER | N | SFO | YY** | 10A | A | B | S |
| 32. NACKE | L | SFO | YB** | 12F | A | ET | M |
| 33. PETERSON | D | SFO | YT** | 14A | A | ET | M |
| 34. ROTHENBERG | M | SFO | FN** | 05B | A | ET | BM |
| 35. SNYDER | C | SFO | YW** | 17A | A | ET | BM |
| 36. TALIGIAN | J | SFO | YQ** | 13F | A | ET | B |
| 37. WAINIO | H | SFO | YW** | 11F | A | BM | 0 |

END NAMES

109130041 108045 0359

The *Associated Press* (via *CNN*) released the final passenger list on *CNN*'s Website; only 26 names are recorded as passengers, including 7 crew members: A total of "45 people on board." *CNN* gave 26 passengers, and 7 crew members, a total of 33 persons; adding 4 hijackers according to the FBI and this would be a total of 37 persons on board and not "45 people on board." Why the *Associated Press* and *CNN* state "45 people on board" contradicting the latter's own list in the article which follows of only 26 passengers and 7 crew members, which coincidentally contradicts the FBI list, the manifest list, and finally the boarding list, is unknown and has never been explained.

CNN.com

CNN.com > in-depth specials

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UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93

United Airlines Flight 93, from Newark, New Jersey, to San Francisco, California, crashed in rural southwest Pennsylvania, with 45 people on board.

CREW

Jason Dahl, 43, from Denver, Colorado, was the plane's captain. He had a wife and son. Dahl had a lifelong interest in flying, said his aunt, Maxine Atkinson, of Waterloo, Iowa.

Leroy Homer, 36, from Marlton, New Jersey, was the first officer on board. He was married and had a daughter.

Lorraine Bay was a flight attendant.

Sandra Bradshaw, 38, of Greensboro, North Carolina, was a flight attendant.

Wanda Green was a flight attendant.

CeeCee Lyles of Fort Myers, Florida, was a flight attendant. She reached her husband, Lorne, by cell phone to tell him that she loved him and their children before the plane went down. The couple between them had four children.

Deborah Welsh was a flight attendant.

PASSENGERS

Christian Adams

Todd Beamer, 32, was from Cranbury, New Jersey.

Alan Beaven, 48, of Oakland, California, was an environmental lawyer.

Mark Bingham, 31, of San Francisco owned a public relations firm, the Bingham Group. He called his mother, Alice Hoglan, 15 minutes before the plane crashed and told her that the plane had been taken over by three men who claimed to have a bomb. Hoglan said her son told her that some passengers planned to try to regain control of the plane. "He said, 'I love you very, very much,' " Hoglan said.

Deora Bodley, 20, of Santa Clara, California, was a university student.

Marion Britton

Thomas E. Burnett Jr., 38, of San Ramon, California, was a senior vice president and chief operating officer of Thoratec Corp., a medical research and development company, and the father of three. He made four calls to his

Deena Burnett, the wife of passenger Thomas Burnett received 4 calls from her husband from Flight UA93. In the above CNN description of these calls, Deena Burnett is reported only saying “that one passenger had been stabbed;” however, the chronology from Deena Burnett’s “Family Foundation Thomas Burnett” Website page of these calls, including the phone records with a summary on all calls from Flight UA93, state further information, and will follow.

wife, Deena, from the plane. Deena Burnett said that her husband told her that one passenger had been stabbed and that "a group of us are going to do something." He also told her that the people on board knew about the attack on the World Trade Center, apparently through other phone calls.

William Cashman

Georgine Corrigan

Joseph Deluca

Patrick Driscoll

Edward Felt, 41, was from Matawan, New Jersey.

Colleen Fraser

Andrew Garcia

Jeremy Glick, 31, from West Milford, New Jersey, called his wife, Liz, and in-laws in New York on a cell phone to tell them the plane had been hijacked, Joanne Makely, Glick's mother-in-law, told CNN. Glick said that one of the hijackers "had a red box he said was a bomb, and one had a knife of some nature," Makely said. Glick asked Makely if the reports about the attacks on the World Trade Center were true, and she told him they were. He left the phone for a while, returning to say, "The men voted to attack the terrorists," Makely said.

Lauren Grandcolas of San Rafael, California, was a sales worker at Good Housekeeping magazine.

Donald F. Green, 52, was from Greenwich, Connecticut.

Linda Gronlund

Richard Guadagno, 38, of Eureka, California, was the manager of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge.

Toshiya Kuge

Waleska Martinez

Nicole Miller

Mark Rothenberg

Christine Snyder, 32, was from Kailua, Hawaii. She was an arborist for the Outdoor Circle and was returning from a conference in Washington. She had been married less than a year.

John Talignani

Honor Wainio

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Deena Burnett clearly tells how her husband told her that one of the hijackers "had a gun." If remembered, another 9/11 hijacked aircraft (Flight AA11) also had a weapon on board, which was used to shoot a passenger, an ex-Israeli Commando Daniel Lewin.³

The first call Deena Burnett gets from her husband is at 06:27 a.m. pacific time, according to her chronology on her Website. (See below) This would mean it was 09:27 a.m. when her husband called her. The first call recorded from Flight UA93 reported on the company airline phone records was Deena Burnett's husband, recorded at 08:30:32 a.m. INT (Indiana Time Zone), which would mean it was 09: 30:32 a.m. since INT is 1 hour back from Eastern Time.

Regardless of the 5 minute difference between Deena Burnett's chronology and the company airline phone record chronology, by 08:30 a.m., Flight UA93 was in trouble: **This would mean just 2 minutes after it took off.** Remember sheet 3 given earlier: The aircraft had a 1 minute

³ [<http://www.scribd.com/doc/65125486/Peddling-Power-1-Flight-AA11>]

delay in takeoff; it taxied for 27 minutes then took off at 08:28 a.m. and not at 08:42:48 a.m. as the initial FAA report shows in Sheet 1. The airline company phone records and Deena Burnett's phone recollection with her husband collaborates that Flight UA93 took off at 08:28 a.m. and not at 08:42:48 a.m.

Two reports from passengers that firearm was on board two hijacked flights are a pattern that has never even been touched by the FBI nor hinted on by the mainstream media. If it had, then United Airlines and American Airlines would not have been granted the following budget that was entered as an Act "PUBLIC LAW 107-42-SEPT. 22, 2001" from the United States Congress directly after 9/11, regardless of the individual plaintiffs who filed actions on July 24, 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for "wrongful death, personal injury or property damages." All reports follow, including the Burnett and airline calls records and boarding passes.

UNITED ECONOMY PLUS

BOARDING PASS

FROM NEWARK

TO SAN FRANCISCO

FLIGHT UA 93

SEAT 100

DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM

BOARDS 7:30 AM

GATE 17

PREMIER EXECUTIVE

IDENTIFIER 104172 BOOKING CODE B

016 7094751835 CPN 1

ISSUING AGENT 014309 AT FIRM BANC

UNITED TICKET

Todd Bearer

UNITED

BOARDING PASS

FROM NEWARK

TO SAN FRANCISCO

FLIGHT UA 93

SEAT 18A

DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM

BOARDS 7:30 AM

GATE 17

IDENTIFIER 104172 BOOKING CODE L

016 5785292691 CPN 4

ISSUING AGENT 272904 AT FIRM BANC

UNITED TICKET

Toshiya Kuge

UNITED

BOARDING PASS

FROM NEWARK

TO SAN FRANCISCO

FLIGHT UA 93

SEAT 210

DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM

BOARDS 7:30 AM

GATE 17

IDENTIFIER 104172 BOOKING CODE B

016 7094751835 CPN 1

ISSUING AGENT 014309 AT FIRM BANC

UNITED TICKET

Kristin Gould
(Olga Kristin White)

WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
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UNITED
MARCIN/HILDOANS
BOARDING PASS

FROM NEWARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
SEAT 17C

DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVES 7:30 AM
GATE 17

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER BOOKING CODE T
016 2164632235 CPN 1
ISSUING AGENT 000000 AT FORDA BANC

E
TICKET

Do not staple to this bag or other bag.
STAPLE HERE
INSERT

Hildagard Marcin

UNITED
FOLGER/JANEC
BOARDING PASS

FROM NEWARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
SEAT 19B

DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVES 7:30 AM
GATE 17

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER BOOKING CODE 9
ISSUING AGENT 000000 AT FORDA BANC

FLT COUPON OR
STAMP REQUIRED

WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Jane Folger

UNITED ECONOMY PLUS
PETERSON/DONALDAMR
BOARDING PASS

FROM NEWARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
SEAT 14A

DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVES 7:30 AM
GATE 17

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER BOOKING CODE T
016 2173718640 CPN 1
ISSUING AGENT 000000 AT FORDA BANC

E
TICKET

Do not staple to this bag or other bag.
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Donald Peterson

TALIGNANI/JOHN

BOARDING PASS

FROM NEWARK

TO SAN FRANCISCO

FLIGHT UA 93

DATE SEP 11 8:00 AM

TIME 7:30 AM

STATUS 17

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 015 7031926873 CPN 1

BOOKING CODE 0

ISSUING AGENT 271551 AT FICMA BANC

UNITED

John Talignani

UNITED ECONOMY PLUS

NACKE/LOUISJ

BOARDING PASS

FROM NEWARK

TO SAN FRANCISCO

FLIGHT UA 93

DATE SEP 11 8:00 AM

TIME 7:30 AM

STATUS 17

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 016 7094556583 CPN 1

BOOKING CODE 0

ISSUING AGENT 271551 AT FICMA BANC

UNITED

Louis Nacke

UNITED

BODLEY/DEORA

BOARDING PASS

FROM NEWARK

TO SAN FRANCISCO

FLIGHT UA 93

DATE SEP 11 8:00 AM

TIME 7:30 AM

STATUS 17

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 016 2172217051 CPN 2

BOOKING CODE 0

ISSUING AGENT 271551 AT FICMA BANC

UNITED

Deora Bodley

WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Britton

TTON/EXTRASEAT
NEWARK
SAN FRANCISCO
FLY UA 93
SEP 11 8:00 AM
7:30 AM
17
FLY COUPON OR
STAMP REQUIRED

Christian Adams

ADAMS/CHRISTIAN
NEWARK
SAN FRANCISCO
FLY UA 93
SEP 11 8:00 AM
7:30 AM
17
FLY COUPON OR
STAMP REQUIRED

UNITED
SNYDER/CHRISTINE
NEWARK
SAN FRANCISCO
FLY UA 93
SEP 11 8:00 AM
7:30 AM
17A
FLY COUPON OR
STAMP REQUIRED

Christine Snyder

UNITED ECONOMY PLUS
GREENE/DONALD
NEWARK
SAN FRANCISCO
FLY UA 93
SEP 11 8:00 AM
7:30 AM
17
FLY COUPON OR
STAMP REQUIRED

Donald Greene

Lauren Grandcolas

GRANDCOLAS/LAURENCRS
BOARDING PASS
FROM NEWARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
CLASS 11D
DATE 17
DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVES 7:30 AM
IDENTIFIER 2705A BOOKING CODE Y
016 2173406104 CPN 2
ISSUING AGENT 354200 AT FIDM BANC

Patricia Cushing

CUSHING/PATRICIA
BOARDING PASS
FROM NEWARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
CLASS 19C
DATE 17
DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVES 7:30 AM
IDENTIFIER 2052A BOOKING CODE Y
016 2171806552 CPN 1
ISSUING AGENT 020200 AT FIDM BANC

Colleen Fraser

FRASER/COLLEEN
BOARDING PASS
FROM NEWARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
CLASS 13A
DATE 17
DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVES 7:30 AM
IDENTIFIER 2705A BOOKING CODE Y
016 2173406104 CPN 2
ISSUING AGENT 354200 AT FIDM BANC

Jean Peterson

PETERSON/JEANCRS
BOARDING PASS
FROM NEWARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
CLASS 14C
DATE 17
DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVES 7:30 AM
IDENTIFIER 2705A BOOKING CODE Y
016 2171806552 CPN 1
ISSUING AGENT 020200 AT FIDM BANC

Alan Beaven

BEAVEN/ALANR
BOARDING PASS
FROM NEWARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
CLASS 17F
DATE 17
DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVES 7:30 AM
IDENTIFIER 2705A BOOKING CODE Y
016 2171778559 CPN 1
ISSUING AGENT 020200 AT FIDM BANC

Nicole Miller

MILLER/NICOLE
BOARDING PASS
FROM NEWARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
CLASS 14A
DATE 17
DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVES 7:30 AM
IDENTIFIER 2705A BOOKING CODE Y
016 2171806552 CPN 1
ISSUING AGENT 020200 AT FIDM BANC

GLICK/JEREMY
BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93
 CLASS 11A
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
 ARRIVES 7:30 AM
 GATE 17
 NAME 11A
 TICKET E

Jeremy Glick

GARCIA/ANDREW
BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93
 CLASS 20C
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
 ARRIVES 7:30 AM
 GATE 17
 NAME 20C
 TICKET E

Andrew Garcia

UNITED ECONOMY PLUS
CORRIGAN/GEORGINE
BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93
 CLASS 12D
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
 ARRIVES 7:30 AM
 GATE 17
 NAME 12D
 TICKET E

Georgine Corrigan

UNITED
GUADAGNO/RICHARD J
BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93
 CLASS 19A
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
 ARRIVES 7:30 AM
 GATE 17
 NAME 19A
 TICKET E

Richard Guadagno

UNITED ECONOMY PLUS
DRISCOLL/PATRICK
BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93
 CLASS 15C
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
 ARRIVES 7:30 AM
 GATE 17
 NAME 15C
 TICKET E

Patrick Driscoll

UNITED ECONOMY PLUS
WAINIO/HONOR
BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93
 CLASS 11F
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
 ARRIVES 7:30 AM
 GATE 17
 NAME 11F
 TICKET E

Honor Wainio

UNITED ECONOMY PLUS
MARTINEZ/WALESKA
BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93
 CLASS 10F
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
 ARRIVES 7:30 AM
 GATE 17
 NAME 10F
 TICKET E

Waleska Martinez

UNITED ECONOMY PLUS
BRITTON/MARION
BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93
 CLASS 12B
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
 ARRIVES 7:30 AM
 GATE 17
 NAME 12B
 TICKET E

Marion Britton

UNITED FIRST
ALNAMI/AHMED
 BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93 SEAT 3C
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM BORDS 7:30 AM GATE 17
Ahmed Alnami Hijacker
 IDENTIFIER VUJCN BOOKING CODE F
 016 2173445510 CPN 1
 ISSUING AGENT 060116 AT F12000 ELMCS
E
 TICKET

UNITED FIRST
DELUCA/JOSEPH
 BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93 SEAT 2B
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM BORDS 7:30 AM GATE 17
Joseph Deluca
 IDENTIFIER SEP1M BOOKING CODE F
 016 2173445511 CPN 1
 ISSUING AGENT 216116 AT F12000 ELMCS
FLY COUPON OR STAMP REQUIRED

UNITED FIRST
ALHAZNAWI/AHMAD
 BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93 SEAT 8B
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM BORDS 7:30 AM GATE 17
Ahmad Alhaznawi Hijacker
 IDENTIFIER SINTC2 BOOKING CODE F
 016 2173445511 CPN 1
 ISSUING AGENT 060583 AT F14333 ELMCS
FLY COUPON OR STAMP REQUIRED

UNITED FIRST
ALGHAMDI/SAEED
 BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93 SEAT 3D
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM BORDS 7:30 AM GATE 17
Saeed Alghamdi
 IDENTIFIER VUJCN BOOKING CODE F
 016 2173445511 CPN 1
 ISSUING AGENT 060116 AT F12000 ELMCS
E
 TICKET

UNITED FIRST
JARRAH/ZIAD
 BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 93 SEAT 1B
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM BORDS 7:30 AM GATE 17
Ziad Jarrah Hijacker
 IDENTIFIER N070TA BOOKING CODE F
 016 2173230812 CPN 1
 ISSUING AGENT 214570 AT F12000 ELMCS
E
 TICKET
WARNING
 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

2 INCHAM/PAK
BOARDING PASS
NEWARK
FLIGHT UA 93
CLASS 4D
CO SAN FRANCISCO
HOURS SEP 11 8:00 AM
GATE 17
PASSENGER JAMES - WORKING CODE P
BOARDING GATE 17 AT PIER 14

FELT/EDWARD
 BOARDING PASS
 FROM NEWARK
 TO SAN FRANCISCO
 FLIGHT UA 85
 DATE 17
 DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM
 ARRIVES 7:30 AM
 DATE 17
 IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 016 7093654940
 CPM 1
 TICKET

UNITED FIRST

ROTHENBERG/MARK

BOARDING PASS

NEWARK Mark Rothenberg

SAN FRANCISCO FLIGHT UA 93 DATE 11 SEP 01

08:00 AM 11 SEP 01

PREMIER EXECUTIVE

016 2173462596 CPH 1

UNITED

UNITED FIRST
DELUCA/JOSEPH/R
FROM MESAROK
TO SAN FRANCISCO FLIGHT 0A 83 SEP 28
DEPARTS SEP 11 8:00 AM ARRIVES 7:30 AM SEP 17

FLY COUPON OR
STAMP REQUIRED

UNITED FIRST
RONLUND/LINEARIS
KIN MELBARK
SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
DATE 12
DEPART SEP 11 8:00 AM
ARRIVE 7:30 PM
Linda Gronlund

FLY COUPON OR
STAMP REQUIRED

CREDIT/FLY 52154 BOOKING CODE IF
ISSUING AGENT 21916 41 P23000 5400

UNITED FIRST
BURNETT/THOMAS
BOARDING PASS
221 MELBARK
TO SAN FRANCISCO
FLIGHT UA 93
DATE 11 SEP 88
TIME 8:00 AM
GATE 17
PREMIER EXECUTIVE 100K
Thomas Burnett
CLASSIFIED REPORT
316 054035114 CPN 1
UNITED AIRCRAFT 11 SEP 88

September 11th Tort Litigation

About the Litigation Latest News Court Papers

About the Litigation

This litigation arises out of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. On July 24, 2002, Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, issued an Order that all actions for wrongful death, personal injury, property damage or business loss currently pending or to be filed pursuant to the [Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub.L. No. 107-42 Section 408\(b\)\(3\), 49 U.S.C. Section 40101 \(2002\)](#) against any airline and/or airline security company, be consolidated for purposes of pretrial proceedings. These consolidated proceedings do not include any actions against any alleged hijackers or terrorists.

In its Order of November 1, 2002, the Court established a master docket for these proceedings: "In Re September 11 Litigation," 21 MC 97 (AKH). In addition, the Clerk of the Southern District of New York has created a link to the September 11 litigation on the Court's website at nysd.uscourts.gov/Sent11Litigation.htm, that includes the Court's Rules of Practice and orders relating to the September 11, 2001 Tort Litigation.

On October 9, 2002, the Court issued an Order regarding the organizational structure for the management of this litigation and appointed Liaison Counsel and a Plaintiffs' Executive Committee, the members of which are:

Liaison Counsel:

Marc S. Moller, Esq., Kreindler & Kreindler LLP

Plaintiffs' Executive Committee

Kreindler & Kreindler LLP
100 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10017

Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Schiavo
12100 Wilshire Boulevard, #95
Los Angeles, CA 90025

Warden Triplett Grier
Building 40 Corporate Woods
9401 Indian Creek Parkway
Overland Park, KS 66210

Warden Triplett Grier
25 Old Broad Street, Level 7
Suite 1100 London EC2N 1HN
England

Baumeister & Samuels, P.C.
One Exchange Plaza
New York, NY 10006

Hanly & Conroy, LLP
415 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10017

Speiser, Krause, Nolan & Granito, P.C.,
Two Grand Central Tower, 34th Floor
140 East 45th Street
New York, NY 10017

Disclaimer

This website is provided as a convenience and is not intended to relieve attorneys who represent individual plaintiffs who have filed actions in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for wrongful death, personal injury or property damages from monitoring the progress of the litigation as it affects their case(s) or their clients' interests.

[Get Adobe Acrobat browser plugin.](#)



Information for Counsel In September 11 Litigation

Upcoming hearings in the September 11 litigation:

- The general court conference scheduled for May 16, 2003 at 2:00 p.m. has been adjourned. No new date has been set.

All hearings are held in Courtroom 14D, 500 Pearl Street.

Cases involving claims arising out of, resulting from, or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001 and naming an airline, an airport security company, and/or The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey have been consolidated for discovery and other pre-trial proceedings. [Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein](#), District Judge, is presiding.

Counsel in such cases should familiarize themselves with Judge Hellerstein's [Rules of Practice](#) and [Rules for Sept. 11 Consolidated Cases](#), as well as his rulings relating to the September 11 Litigation.

Images of certain orders affecting procedures and case management, and certain opinions, are accessible via the following hyperlinks:

- 6/20/03 [Opinion Partially Granting and Partially Denying Motions to Remand to State Court](#) (21-MC-100)
- 5/8/03 [June Colaio, et al. v. Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al.](#) (03-CV-558)
- 2/11/03 [Case Management Order](#) (21-MC-100)
- 2/3/03 [Supplemental case management order](#) (21-MC-97)
- 1/31/03 [Order re: motions to serve late notice of claim](#) (21-MC-97)
- 11/12/02 [Rulings of conference held](#) on November 1, 2002. (21-MC-97)
- 11/1/02 [Master Docket Order](#) (21-MC-97)
- 10/23/02 Spagnuolo v. PA-NY-NJ: [Order denying motion for certification of interlocutory appeal.](#)
- 10/22/02 Spagnuolo v. PA-NY-NJ: [Order denying motion for reconsideration.](#)
- 10/15/02 [Summary of rulings](#) made at hearing of 10/3/02.
- 10/9/02 [Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Joint Status Report](#) Regarding Formation of Committees and Subcommittees
- 10/4/02 [Order Striking Class Action](#)
- 9/11/02 Graybill v. NYC & PA-NY-NJ: [Order remanding to state court.](#)
- 09/6/02 [Order Regarding Port Authority Cases](#)
- 07/24/02 [Consolidation Order](#)

Counsel are advised also to sign up on the CourtWeb Watch List (watching the lead case, 01 Civ. 11628) for notification of new orders and decisions. [CourtWeb](#) permits Internet access to most orders and decisions entered in these cases.

Public Law 107-42
107th Congress

An Act

Sept. 22, 2001
[H.R. 2926]

To preserve the continued viability of the United States air transportation system.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Air
Transportation
Safety and
System
Stabilization Act.
49 USC 40101
note.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act”.

TITLE I—AIRLINE STABILIZATION

49 USC 40101
note.
President.
Terrorism.

SEC. 101. AVIATION DISASTER RELIEF.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall take the following actions to compensate air carriers for losses incurred by the air carriers as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001:

(1) Subject to such terms and conditions as the President deems necessary, issue Federal credit instruments to air carriers that do not, in the aggregate, exceed \$10,000,000,000 and provide the subsidy amounts necessary for such instruments in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.).

(2) Compensate air carriers in an aggregate amount equal to \$5,000,000,000 for—

(A) direct losses incurred beginning on September 11, 2001, by air carriers as a result of any Federal ground stop order issued by the Secretary of Transportation or any subsequent order which continues or renews such a stoppage; and

(B) the incremental losses incurred beginning September 11, 2001, and ending December 31, 2001, by air carriers as a direct result of such attacks.

(b) **EMERGENCY DESIGNATION.**—Congress designates the amount of new budget authority and outlays in all fiscal years resulting from this title as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(e)). Such amount shall be available only to the extent that a request, that includes designation of such amount as an emergency requirement as defined in such Act, is transmitted by the President to Congress.

NOTE: In the above Public Law Act, it records \$5,000,000,000 will be compensated to the airlines of the planes involved in the 9/11 hijackings as “a result of any Federal ground stop

order issued by the Secretary of Transportation or any subsequent order which continues or renews such a stoppage.” This basically describes the Scatana order ⁴ which was allegedly given by the Secretary of Transportation, Norman Mineta, at 09:45 a.m. on 9/11. However, this turns out not to be true. The order for all commercial airlines to be grounded was never implemented, even in the afternoon at 14:30 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) as the following “Chronology ADA-30, Operations Center Terrorist Attacks NY-DC 9/11/01” report acknowledges.

| | |
|--------|--|
| 1428 | AAL ROC return to bldg. |
| 1430 | Cusack on duty. Via ADA/Noel FAA is not activating Scatana, not shutting down any nav aids. Commercial flights are not expected to resume until 9/12 after 1200E. |
| 1444 | Corcoran, Cusack, Newby, Fawley AWP reports traffic. |
| 1445 | Computer room conf ended, will reestablish at 1530E, unkn if FAA will be added. |
|) 1450 | Via AEA ROC/Comanche HIJACKED ACFT: AAL 11, B767, BOS-LAX, crashed into World Trade 92 POB all fatal; UAL 175, B767, BOS-LAX; AAL 77, B757, IAD-LAX crashed into NMCC 64 POB. UAL 93, B757, EWR-SFO, crashed south of Indian Lade Arpt, PA, UNKN POB, all fatal. |
| 1455 | Conf OST/Faherty with AOA/Rochelle ref AOA-1 call. |

Page 2 of 2

Norman Mineta made the air carriers (United Airlines and American Airlines) a humoungous \$5,000,000,000 in compensation from the U.S. Congress, when he gave incorrect testimony regarding the implementation of Scatana at the 9/11 Commission Hearing. According to NORAD:

During a time of war or crisis (such as an attack from Russian Bombers) the commander of NORAD has the authority to declare an Air Defense Emergency (one of only two “EMERGCONs” or “Emergency Conditions”) and order the grounding of all commercial aircraft before implementing Security Control of Air Traffic And Navigation Aids (Scatana).

Scatana deactivates the entire U.S. air navigation system and transfers control of all air monitoring assets to NORAD. NORAD, meanwhile, deploy their own much more sophisticated and combat-specific radar system, which is air-based and involves assets such as the Boeing E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) platform. These aircraft provide a much more accurate 3D map of the battlefield, and coordinate friendly aircraft in their actions against any threats.

General Eberhart, who says he requested a “modified Scatana,” at the time, but does not exactly say at what time it was executed, explains why he waited before requesting it when he gave an interview in *The Washington Post* on June 17, 2004. ⁵ Regardless if he received his “modified Scatana,” no Scatana order modified or otherwise was implemented by 14:30 p.m. and no report records it was implemented at a later time on 9/11.

⁴ According to the Website of Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), Scatana was a “Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids (Short Title: Scatana), by the FAA from 1986.” [http://ntl.bts.gov/ref/biblio/govsafe.html]

⁵ [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49429-2004Jun17_5.html]

EBERHART:

Scatana is a procedure that, as you say, allows us to take control of the air space. It's a procedure that was designed, again, to counter the Soviet Union and their long-range bombers. It's a procedure that if I had tried, and as the people approached me with, "Declare Scatana," the problem was that we could not control the air space that day with the radars we had and all the aircraft that were airborne, 4,000 to 5,000 airplanes airborne. So if I suddenly, "We've got it, we will control the air space," we would have had worse problems than we had that morning, because I cannot provide traffic de-confliction like the FAA has.

What mine is designed to do is we see a bomber coming from a long range, we tell everybody to get the aircraft down safely, then nothing flies and we control the air space. We are prepared to do that. But we're not prepared suddenly to take control of the air space and say, "We have it," because now we're talking, in terms of safety and security of air travel, we're talking about a bad situation getting worse.

The other thing, and I have the authority to do that. But I have the authority to do it against an external threat; the second thing that's very important to note, there are procedures in Scatana that are designed to counter long-range bombers.

For example, we're supposed to turn off all the navigational aids. That morning, the last thing we wanted to do was turn off all the navigational aids. You turn them off so that the enemy bombers can't use them. But we don't want to turn them off so that the airplanes can't land safely. We don't want to turn them off so that law enforcement and 'Flight For Life can't fly.'

So what we did, and you said we executed it, but I think it's very important that we note that when we executed it, we executed a modified Scatana ⁶ and that's what I told them is, "I will execute Scatana once you have a modified SCATANA that clearly delineates the lines in the road and doesn't cause a bad situation from getting worse." So our Scatana said, "Leave the nav aids on." Our Scatana said, "FAA, you still control the traffic that's flying." Our Scatana said, "Law enforcement and 'Flight For Life' can continue to fly." We don't want to ground them during this terrible tragedy, and then procedures for getting waivers to fly.

END OF COMMENT

We see, by General Eberhart's account, that only a partial Scatana was implemented which was not even activated by 14:30 p.m. So why did Norman Mineta tell the 9/11 Commission he gave an order that turns out to be false? If Mr. Mineta lied to secure the Congress compensation for both airlines involved in the attacks and also was in need to produce himself as being an active Secretary of Transportation during the disasters, which would pacify the public, the U.S. Congress, the military, and reduce questions from the mainstream media if they had any inclination to ask as to airport/airline security being breached on September 11, 2001, can only be guessed at this point. However, motive is rarely unselfish.

⁶ Author's underline.

United Airlines Flight #93
Telephone Calls
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
AIRCRAFT ID: 151721341



| Time | Time Zone | Axis Call Id | Billed Card Type | Swiped Card | Name (Assigned Seat) | Destination Number | Last Dated Number | Manual Entry Ind | Validation Approved Code Decoded | RBS Id | RBS Id | Terminal Unit | Distribu- tion Unit | Seat Location | Number Of Handoff | Open- prior Id | Weight On Wheels | Duration Connect | Duration Operator | Scp Duration |
|---------|-----------|----------------|------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| 8:30:32 | INT | 20010911103838 | CS | 8912889316542428 | Thomas Burnett (4B) | | | T | Approved | 058 FMY FT WAYNE | 058 | 28 | 2 | 24 ABC | 1 | | 2 | 17 | 0 | 28 |
| 8:32:39 | INT | 20010911104110 | AS | 8914849099999998 | Flight Attendant | | | F | | 026 FMY FT WAYNE | 026 | 38 | 2 | 34 ABC | 0 | | 2 | 13 | 0 | 95 |
| 9:31:14 | ET | 20010911103848 | AS | 8914849099999998 | Flight Attendant | | | F | | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 38 | 2 | 34 ABC | 0 | | 2 | 18 | 0 | 2 |
| 9:35:40 | ET | 20010911104778 | AS | 8914849099999998 | Flight Attendant | | | F | | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 38 | 1 | 33 DEF | 1 | | 2 | 12 | 0 | 353 |
| 9:35:48 | ET | 20010911104411 | AS | 8914849099999998 | Flight Attendant | | | F | | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 38 | 2 | 34 ABC | 0 | | 2 | 100 | 0 | 4 |
| 9:35:56 | ET | 20010911104421 | AS | 8914849099999998 | Flight Attendant | | | F | | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 37 | 2 | 33 ABC | 0 | | 2 | 100 | 0 | 4 |
| 9:38:10 | ET | 20010911104334 | MC | 5409970272076282 | Mark Bingham (4C) | | | F | Approved | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 30 | 1 | 25 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 36 | 0 | 5 |
| 9:37:03 | ET | 20010911104839 | MC | 5409970272076282 | Mark Bingham (4C) | | | F | Approved | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 30 | 1 | 25 DEF | 1 | | 2 | 16 | 0 | 166 |
| 9:37:41 | ET | 20010911118703 | VI | 4719240901140034 | Jeremy Glick (11A) | | | F | | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 32 | 1 | 27 DEF | 8 | | 2 | 14 | 0 | 7565 |
| 9:37:53 | ET | 20010911104573 | CS | 8912889316542428 | Thomas Burnett (4B) | | | T | Approved | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 28 | 2 | 25 ABC | 0 | | 2 | 24 | 0 | 62 |
| 9:39:21 | ET | 20010911104651 | VI | 4019014000737215 | Lauren Grandcolas (11D) | | | F | Approved | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 28 | 1 | 23 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 14 | 0 | 46 |
| 9:40:42 | ET | 20010911104717 | VI | 4019014000737215 | Lauren Grandcolas (11D) | | | F | Approved | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 28 | 1 | 23 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 22 | 0 | |
| 9:41:20 | ET | 20010911104759 | MC | 5409970272076282 | Mark Bingham (4C) | | | F | Approved | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 30 | 1 | 25 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 16 | 0 | |
| 9:41:34 | ET | 20010911104786 | VI | 4019014000737215 | Lauren Grandcolas (11D) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 28 | 1 | 23 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 14 | 0 | 4 |
| 9:41:53 | ET | 20010911104853 | MC | 5409970272076282 | Mark Bingham (4C) | | | F | Approved | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 30 | 1 | 25 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 33 | 0 | 3 |
| 9:42:03 | ET | 20010911104829 | VI | 4019014000737215 | Lauren Grandcolas (11D) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 28 | 1 | 23 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 14 | 0 | 2 |
| 9:42:13 | ET | 20010911104881 | VI | 4719240901140034 | Joseph DeLuca (8B) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 31 | 1 | 26 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 20 | 0 | 14 |
| 9:42:25 | ET | 20010911104873 | VI | 4019014000737215 | Lauren Grandcolas (11D) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 28 | 1 | 23 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| 9:42:44 | ET | 20010911104983 | DC | 3886550918305 | Todd Beamer (10C) | | | F | Denied | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 37 | 1 | 32 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 4 | 0 | |
| 9:42:44 | ET | 20010911104959 | DC | 3886550918305 | Todd Beamer (10C) | | | F | Denied | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 37 | 1 | 32 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 45 | 0 | |
| 9:43:45 | ET | 20010911104913 | VI | 4019014000737215 | Lauren Grandcolas (11D) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 28 | 1 | 23 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 14 | 0 | 3 |
| 9:43:03 | ET | 20010911105185 | VI | 4719240901140034 | Joseph DeLuca (8B) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 31 | 1 | 26 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 15 | 0 | 130 |
| 9:43:24 | ET | 20010911104956 | VI | 4019014000737215 | Lauren Grandcolas (11D) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 28 | 1 | 23 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 7 | 0 | |
| 9:43:44 | ET | 20010911105042 | VI | 4019014000737215 | Lauren Grandcolas (11D) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 28 | 1 | 23 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 25 | 0 | 7 |
| 9:43:46 | ET | 20010911105555 | DC | 3886550918305 | Todd Beamer (10C) | | | F | Denied | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 37 | 1 | 32 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 3 | 0 | |
| 9:43:48 | ET | 20010911103882 | DC | 3886550918305 | Todd Beamer (10C) | | | F | Denied | 091 BELV BELLEVILLE | 091 | 37 | 1 | 32 DEF | 8 | PJ | 2 | 77 | 3825 | |
| 9:44:23 | ET | 20010911105201 | CS | 8912889316542428 | Thomas Burnett (4B) | | | T | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 28 | 2 | 25 ABC | 0 | | 2 | 20 | 0 | 54 |
| 9:45:37 | ET | 20010911105450 | AX | 372763181001002 | Wlenska Martinez (10F) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 38 | 2 | 34 ABC | 0 | | 2 | 138 | 0 | |
| 9:46:05 | ET | 20010911105428 | VI | 4719240901140034 | Linda Gronlund (3A) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 31 | 1 | 26 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 26 | 0 | 71 |
| 9:47:57 | ET | 20010911105619 | VI | 4270830046957056 | Cecese Lyles (Crew) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 38 | 2 | 31 ABC | 0 | | 2 | 35 | 0 | 56 |
| 9:48:48 | ET | 20010911105555 | VI | 4719240901140034 | Joseph DeLuca (8B) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 31 | 1 | 26 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 9 | 0 | |
| 9:49:12 | ET | 20010911106114 | DS | 6011022390640779 | Marion Bolton (2B) | | | T | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 37 | 2 | 33 ABC | 3 | | 2 | 9 | 0 | 232 |
| 9:49:30 | ET | 20010911105854 | VI | 4118212018643637 | Sandra Bradshaw (Crew) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 38 | 1 | 33 DEF | 0 | | 2 | 15 | 0 | |
| 9:50:04 | ET | 20010911117290 | VI | 4118212018643637 | Sandra Bradshaw (Crew) | | | F | Approved | 058 COLUM COLUMBUS | 058 | 38 | 1 | 33 DEF | 3 | | 2 | 33 | 0 | 470 |
| 9:53:43 | ET | 20010911117288 | DS | 6011022390640779 | Honer Walno (11F) | | | T | Approved | CAPL CORAOPOLIS | 065 | 37 | 2 | 33 ABC | 0 | | 2 | 11 | 0 | 269 |
| 9:58:00 | ET | | | Cell Phone (941 823-2355) | Cecese Lyles (Crew) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9:58:00 | ET | | | Cell Phone (732 241-8974) | Edward Felt (2D) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

TOM BURNETT
FAMILY FOUNDATION


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Transcript of Tom's last calls to Deena

6:27 a.m.(pacific time) First cell phone call from Tom to Deena

- Deena: Hello
- Tom: Deena
- Deena: Tom, are you O.K.?
- Tom: No, I'm not. I'm on an airplane that has been hijacked.
- Deena: hijacked?
- Tom: Yes, They just knifed a guy.
- Deena: A passenger?
- Tom: Yes.
- Deena: Where are you? Are you in the air?
- Tom: Yes, yes, just listen. Our airplane has been hijacked. It's United Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco. We are in the air. The hijackers have already knifed a guy, **one of them has a gun**, they are telling us there is a bomb on board, please call the authorities. He hung up.

6:31 Deena calls 911



FBI flash card of calls made

In Won-Young Kim and Gerald R. Baum's Seismic Report, conducted for the Pentagon from Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University and the Environmental Geology and Mineral Resources Program, Maryland Geological Survey, they concluded in their analysis, for Flight UA93:

Figure 5 shows seismic record section of vertical-component records from four stations around the United Airlines Flight 93 crash site near Shanksville, Somerset County, Pennsylvania. The location of the site is taken from the Website for the Flight 93 Memorial.⁷ The four closest stations range in distance from 92 to 218 km (Table 1). Two minutes of vertical-component seismic records starting from estimated origin time of 14:06:05 (10:06:05 EDT) are plotted.

The seismic signals are relatively weak compared with the background noise level. For instance, at stations MCWV and SDMD, the signal (portion of signals just after S_g) to noise (portion of records just before P_g arrivals) ratios are about 1:1, whereas, at station SSPA the ratio is about 2.5:1 and at MVL it is about 2:1 (Figure 5).

⁷ [<http://www.shanksvillememorial.com>]




Figure 5: Seismic record section of vertical records from the United Airlines Flight 93 crash near Shanksville, Pa on Sept. 11, 2001. Relatively consistent seismic signals arrivals are discernible at stations, SSPA and MVL. Maximum zero-to-peak amplitude at SSPA is about 140 nm/s.

The scientists conclude that “The seismic signals marked as Sg in Figure 5 propagated from the Shanksville crash site to the stations with approximately 3.5 km/s. Hence, we infer that the **Flight 93 crashed around 14:06:05_5 (UTC) (10:06:05 EDT)**. The uncertainty is only due to seismic velocity at the uppermost crust near the surface in which the Lg waves propagated.”


Independence

Seismic Event: The Final Moments of Flight 93

Robb Magley

Evidence from the seismic record indicates there was at least one supersonic warplane within striking distance of Flight 93 on the fateful morning of September 11, 2001. A signal exhibiting the seismic signature characteristic of a passing sonic boom was recorded at 09:22 a.m. local time by an earthquake monitoring station in southern Pennsylvania. This station is just 60 miles from the abandoned strip-mine in Somerset County where the Boeing 757-200 hit the earth at 10:06 a.m.

A sonic boom is the audible pressure wave that travels along the path of an aircraft moving faster than the speed of sound. The effect of this increase in pressure is to displace, albeit slightly, the surface of the earth in a very predictable way: The earth is pushed downwards, then released and pulled upwards. The resulting chart of displacement versus time is quite distinct from other seismic events:



Seismographs of the sonic boom, recorded at approximately 09:22 a.m. on September 11, 2001

The presence of this particular sonic boom at 09:22 a.m. refutes the story we have been told of the military's response to 9/11. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (or NORAD), issued a press release one week after the attacks. The timeline told of Air National Guard fighter jets taking off from bases in Massachusetts and Virginia at 08:46 a.m. and 09:30 a.m. respectively. The first jets, two F-15's from Otis Air National Guard Base, responded at 08:40 a.m. scramble order and screamed towards New York City six minutes later. The second group, F-16's from Langley AFB, responded to a 09:24 a.m. order and again was en route to their target in 6 minutes, this time pointing towards Washington, D.C. and the threatened Pentagon.

The problem with this story is that neither group of fighters could have made the sonic boom recorded in Pennsylvania by 09:22 a.m.

The F-16's from Langley hadn't even been told to get into the air yet, so they're out. The F-15's from Otis reached New York at 09:06 a.m. three (3) minutes too late to stop the second World Trade Center impact, having averaged a speed of around 800 miles per hour to get there. They could have covered the 207 miles from NYC to the seismic station in Pennsylvania in a mere 15 minutes at that speed. But this would have required them to leave New York City undefended at 09:07 a.m. merely 1 minute after arriving. It would also have required a sixth sense, since the FAA didn't even warn NORAD that Flight 93 was considered a possible threat until 09:16 a.m.

While we don't know where the jet that created the sonic boom came from, we can safely assume that any aircraft moving supersonically over the continental U.S. by 09:22 a.m. on September 11, 2001, was part of our own military. And not knowing the fighter's home base does little to change the fact that it would have been in excellent position to intercept Flight 93 well before it crashed at 10:06 a.m.

Major General Paul A. Weaver Jr., Director of the Air National Guard, has told reporters that National Guard aircraft "weren't even close" to the fourth hijacked airliner. Thanks to the seismic record, we can now suggest there was little gold in his remarks.


Tracking aircraft in flight with seismic networks is not a new idea. NASA has looked at ground-recorded sonic boom signatures of aircraft like the F-18 and the SR-71; scientists at the California Institute of Technology have examined data from existing networks for events like the landing of the space shuttle Discovery. Seismic networks have also been used to determine the time of aircraft crashes; indeed, when the United States Army wanted to know with greater accuracy exactly when Flight 77 struck the Pentagon on 9/11, they turned to seismologists at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at Columbia University, and the Maryland Geological Survey. Won-Young Kim and Gerald R. Baum were unable to definitively set the impact time of the Pentagon crash, but they were able to determine the time of Flight 93's impact to within 5 seconds (10:06:05 \pm 5, EDT).

In the days and weeks following the crash, rumours circulated of a shoot-down, the scenario being that the military brought the airliner down before it could reach a more populated area. It should be said that just because we now know a fighter was close enough to do the grim job, it doesn't necessarily follow that the job was done: There is still no direct proof that the unknown fighter chose to fire upon Flight 93. The question, however, remains: Why would NORAD misrepresent where their fighters were if they didn't shoot it down?

Back in December, we learned from Lt. Colonel Robert Marr, Commander of the North East Aerospace Defense Sector (NEADS) that there was a third group of fighters in the air on the morning of 9/11. This group launched from the Toledo Express Airport in Ohio, and was comprised of F-16's from the 112th Fighter Squadron, part of the 180th Fighter Wing. These pilots, known as the Stingers, were not on any active alert status; in fact, when they were told to scramble aircraft to defend New York, their fighters needed to be reconfigured from training missions and armed for the new duty.

The Stingers were still able to launch in sixteen minutes, a time Lt. Col. Marr considered “phenomenal” considering how much they had to do to get combat-ready F-16’s airborne. Could these F-16’s have caused the sonic boom at the seismic station?

According to Lt. Col. Marr, the 112th’s F-16’s were not ordered to scramble until 10:01 a.m. lifting off at 10:17 a.m. well after the sonic boom at 09:22 a.m. However, the math gets rather interesting. Think of what follows as an airborne version of the old story problem that begins, “...a train leaves Boston, and another leaves San Francisco....”



Imagine that the fighters based in Toledo got the order to defend New York at the same time that the same order was received by the fighters in Massachusetts: 08:40 a.m. With the 16-minute response time (“phenomenal”) the 112th could manage, they would be in the air at 08:56 a.m. Our hypothetical fighter group is now headed for New York City where, at the time, all the trouble is. Let’s give them 2 minutes to assemble and head out in formation; the time is 08:58 a.m. Interestingly, their hypothetical flight path goes almost directly over an obscure seismic station in southern Pennsylvania. That station is some 314 miles away from their starting point, and, traveling at 800 miles per hour, they reach it in just about 24 minutes. They reach the station at just about 09:22 a.m. In two minutes, NORAD will learn from the FAA that Flights 77 and 93 have apparently been hijacked. At 09:24 a.m. NORAD will order the Langley F-16’s to try to intercept Flight 77. They will nearly make it.

The Otis F-15’s have been flying over New York for 18 minutes. With all the threats in the air, NORAD has no intention of telling them to leave. In about 10 minutes, Flight 93 will make a dramatic U-turn near Cleveland. Its new, unscheduled flight path puts it into a dead-on course for Washington, D.C. It will likely overfly at least one nuclear reactor and the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis before reaching the beltway.

The closest forces that can intercept them are the hypothetical fighters, which have already made a not-so-hypothetical sonic boom. Assuming the fighters had been continuing toward New York, they now had merely to make a U-turn of their own to handily intercept Flight 93, well before the 10:06 a.m. crash.

Vice-President Dick Cheney has confirmed that the order to shoot down any airliner headed for D.C. that refused to alter course had been given after the Pentagon had been hit, and a fourth plane appeared to be headed for the capital. The fighters were in place. The airliner refused to change course. The order had been given. And there was plenty of time. History was about to take place, and to be covered up. But for an obscure seismic station, it might never have come to light.

END OF ARTICLE

The hijacker that was piloting the aircraft, always according to the FBI, is Ziad Samir Jarrah. Among the two black boxes found from Flight UA93, and will be discussed later, was the Cockpit Voice Recorder; though the last 3 minutes of the recording “was unaccounted for” and FBI Director, Robert Mueller declined to elaborate further on this at the time.



Foto originale di Ziad Jarrah diffusa dall'FBI

Foto del passaporto di Jarrah ritrovato nella buca del volo UA-93

Altra foto ufficiale di Ziad Jarrah

Foto del visto studentesco di Ziad Jarrah.

FBI image

Passport image Found at crash site

Alternate official image

Student card image



The Cockpit Voice Recorder, that the families listened to, ended at 10:02 a.m. Remember that the aircraft was in trouble by 08:30 a.m. just 2 minutes after takeoff corroborated by the FAA chronology and the spouse of one of the passengers. Also remember the 14 minute and 48 second time difference of takeoff from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) versus the FAA, the 9/11 Commission Report, and the FBI.

This flight was wandering around U.S. airspace from 08:28 a.m. when it took off, till whatever time it “crashed” well after 10:00 a.m. The official theory of when the aircraft actually “crashed” differs as the following timeline shows.

Flight UA93 crash timeline

| | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| 10:02 a.m. Cockpit Voice Recorder ends | FAA |
| 10:03 a.m. Crashed | NORAD-NIST-9/11 Commission Report |
| 10:04 a.m. Lost primary radar | FAA |
| 10:04 a.m. Plane is 15 miles south | Air Traffic Controller Dennis Fritz |
| 10:05 a.m. Plane flying low, erratic | Witness accounts |
| 10:06:05 a.m. crashed | Seismic data |

After Flight UA93 “crashed,” Major Daniel Nash, one of the F-15 pilots sent to New York, stated that he was told that a military F-16 had shot down an airliner in Pennsylvania. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz confirmed the reports, saying: “The Air Force was tracking the hijacked plane that crashed in Pennsylvania, and had been in position to bring it down if necessary;” but Wolfowitz would not state for certain if the jets actually hit Flight UA93.

Col. Donn de Grande-Pre, a retired and former Pentagon arms negotiator, noted the plane was shot down by a jet from Langley Air Force Base, but he could not corroborate his account.

At 09:56 a.m. just 6 minutes before NORAD claims Flight UA93 “crashed,” the ex-Vice President gives the military the order to shoot down the aircraft, according to several mainstream media reports: The aircraft was being followed by an F-16.

According to another report, by James Bamford, “As the plane got closer to the White House, General W.M. Winfred, Commander of NMCC, [at the Pentagon] passed on Cheney’s order to shoot down Flight UA93 to Air Force Colonel Robert Marr, who sent out instructions to shoot down Flight UA93.”

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The Day of the Attack

Cheney Authorized Shooting Down Planes

By Dana Milbank

Washington Post Staff Writer

Friday, June 18, 2004; Page A01

At 10:39 on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, Vice President Cheney, in a bunker beneath the White House, told Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld in a videoconference that he had been informed earlier that morning that hijacked planes were approaching Washington.

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"Pursuant to the president's instructions, I gave authorization for them to be taken out," Cheney told Rumsfeld, who was at the Pentagon. Informing Rumsfeld that the fighter pilots had received orders to fire, Cheney added, "It's my understanding they've already taken a couple of aircraft out."

Cheney's comments, which were soon proved erroneous, were detailed in a report issued

yesterday by the commission investigating the terrorist attacks. The comments are part of the considerable confusion that surrounded top government officials as the tense drama unfolded.

The commission's description of actions taken by Cheney and President Bush, based in part on interviews with both men, provides new details of that morning. The report portrays the vice president taking command from his

bunker while Bush, who was in Florida, communicated with the White House in a series of phone calls, and occasionally had trouble getting through.

Cheney, who told the commission he was operating on instructions from Bush given in a phone call, issued authority for aircraft threatening Washington to be shot down. But the commission noted that "among the sources that reflect other important events that morning there is no documentary evidence for this

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Bush counselor Karen Hughes, left, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, center, and Cheney monitored the situation from the White House operations center. (David Bohrer -- White House via AP)

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call, although the relevant sources are incomplete." Those sources include people nearby taking notes, such as Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, and Cheney's wife, Lynne.

Bush and Cheney told the commission that they remember the phone call; the president said it reminded him of his time as a fighter pilot. National security adviser Condoleezza Rice, who had joined Cheney, told the commission that she heard the vice president discuss the rules of engagement for fighter jets over Washington with Bush.

Within minutes, Cheney would use his authority. Told -- erroneously, as it turned out -- that a presumably hijacked aircraft was 80 miles from Washington, Cheney decided "in about the time it takes a batter to swing" to authorize fighter jets scrambled from Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Va., to engage it, the commission reported.

Only later did White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua B. Bolten suggest that Cheney call Bush once more to confirm the engagement order, according to the commission. Logs in Cheney's bunker and on Air Force One confirm conversations at 10:18 and 10:20, respectively.

Later, Cheney spoke to Rumsfeld via videoconference. When the vice president said the orders had been relayed to the jets and "a couple of aircraft" had been downed, Rumsfeld replied: "We can't confirm that. We're told that one aircraft is down but we do not have a pilot report that they did it."

But the commission determined that the Langley fighter jets sent to circle Washington never received the shoot-down order. It was passed down the chain of command, but commanders of the North American Aerospace Defense Command's northeast sector did not give it to the pilots.

"Both the mission commander and the weapons director indicated they did not pass the order to fighters circling Washington and New York City because they were unsure how the pilots would, or should, proceed with this guidance," the commission reported.

"In short," the report added, "while leaders believed the fighters circling above them had been instructed to 'take out' hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the Langley pilots were to 'ID type and tail.' "

Unknown to Cheney or Bush, however, by 10:45 other fighter jets would be circling Washington, and these had clear authority to shoot down planes, the commission determined. They were sent from Andrews Air Force Base by the commander of the 113th Wing of the Air National Guard, in consultation with the Secret Service, which relayed instructions that an agent said were from Cheney.

That arrangement was "outside the military chain of command," according to the commission report. Bush and Cheney told the commission they were unaware that fighters had been scrambled from Andrews.

CNN

Rumsfeld's Freudian Slip: Plane "Shot Down" Over Pennsylvania December 26, 2004

Donald Rumsfeld's visit to Iraq, a surprise visit, at Camp Victory in Baghdad where he is shown on video speaking to soldiers in the mess hall:

RUMSFELD:

And to change that way of living, would strike at the very essence of our country. And I think all of us have a sense if we imagine the kind of world we would face if the people who bombed the mess hall in Mosul, or the people who did the bombing in Spain, **or the people who attacked the United States in New York, shot down the plane over Pennsylvania, and attacked the Pentagon,** the people who cut off peoples' heads on television to intimidate, to frighten, indeed the word "terrorized" is just that. Its purpose is to terrorize, to alter behaviour, to make people be something other than that which they want to be.

END OF REPORTS

How could Flight UA93 wander around U.S. airspace for 1 hour and 30 minutes after it had been taken over by hijackers within 2 minutes of flight travel?

There are major discrepancies throughout Flight UA93's chronology of events; no other hijacked aircraft on September 11, 2001, has so many irregularities, from takeoff time, from phone call times, from Cockpit Voice Recorder times, and from the official theory times. This can only be accounted for to discredit what actually happened, and allow the aircraft crash in Shanksville, Pennsylvania by no other means but from the heroic efforts of its passengers. But even the account of how many passengers were on board is uncertain.

| Event | Agency | Irregularity |
|--|---|--|
| Takeoff at 08:28 a.m. | Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) | A 14 minute and 48 second time difference |
| Takeoff at 08:42:48 a.m. | 1. FAA 2. 9/11 Commission Report 3. FBI | |
| Bottom of the flash card: 33 passengers, 4 hijackers. Total of 37 persons | FBI flash card | If the names are counted, not including the crew, they come to a total of 38 passengers and not 37 persons as stated at the bottom of the flash card |
| William Caghman vs William Cashman | FBI | Passenger surname changed |
| Kristin Gould vs Olga Kristin White | FBI | Passenger surname changed |
| Passenger John Talignani | FBI | Expired driver's license found at crash site |
| Passenger list states "45 people on board." | <i>Associated Press</i> via <i>CNN</i> | Boarding list has 38 persons (including hijackers) Add 7 crew members = 45 |

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| | | FBI list has 37 persons (including hijackers) Add 7 crew members = 44 CNN states 45 persons; they coincide with the boarding list, however, <i>CNN's</i> final passenger list has only 26 passengers and 7 crew members = 33 people on board Flight UA93. <i>CNN</i> removed 12 names from their passenger list. |
| Passenger Thomas Burnett | 1. FAA Chronology 2. Deena Burnett (spouse) | Reported one of the hijackers has a gun. |
| Flight UA93 was in trouble just 2 minutes after it took off | 1. Airline company phone records 2. Deena Burnett (spouse) | Passenger Thomas Burnett reports one of the hijackers has a gun. |
| 10:02 a.m. CVR | FAA | Cockpit Voice Recorder ends |
| 10:03 a.m. Crashed | | 1. NORAD 2. NIST 3. 9/11 Commission Report |
| 10:04 a.m. | FAA | Lost primary radar |
| 10:04 a.m. plane is 15 miles south | ATC | Air Traffic Controller Dennis Fritz |
| 10:05 a.m. Plane spotted | Witness accounts | Flying low, erratic |
| 10:06:05 a.m. Crashed | Seismic data | |
| ? | Presidential shoot down order | ? |
| Plane identified | Mayor Michael R. White | Cleveland Hopkins International Airport |
| April 10, 2003: Plane identified | David Freedman UA employee | |

9NEWS STAFF

Plane Lands In Cleveland; Bomb Feared Aboard

Liz Foreman

September 11, 2001 (11:43:57 a.m.)

A Boeing 767 out of Boston made an emergency landing Tuesday at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport due to concerns that it may have a bomb aboard, said Mayor Michael R. White. White said the plane had been moved to a secure area of the airport, and was evacuated. United identified the plane as Flight 93. The airline did [not?] say how many people were aboard the flight. United said it was also “deeply concerned” about another flight, Flight 175, a Boeing 767, which was bound from Boston to Los Angeles. On behalf of the airline CEO James Goodwin said: “The thoughts of everyone at United are with the passengers and crew of these flights. Our prayers are also with everyone on the ground who may have been involved. United is working with all the relevant authorities, including the FBI, to obtain further information on these flights,” he said.

END OF REPORT

It is a pity the above report does not give us the time Flight UA93 landed at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, but we know from the *Associated Press*, that the airport was evacuated at 10:00 a.m. Furthermore, another flight (Delta Airlines 1989) was quarantined at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport after it landed at 10:10 a.m. We also have reporter Rick Earle from *ABC* stating he spoke with a 911 operator in Greensburgh. About 09:58 a.m. the 911 emergency center received a cellular call from a man claiming to be a passenger on board Flight UA93. The caller told the operator the plane was being hijacked, then relayed there had been an explosion on the aircraft, saw a cloud of white smoke, then the line went dead.

Should one of the alleged hijackers (Haznawi) actually pass through checkpoint security some triggering device which went off as the aircraft was in the air, also corroborates the peculiar fact that additional debris from the aircraft was found 6 to 8 miles away from Shanksville. The second debris looks like something fell off the aircraft 6 miles away before it crashed. The FBI concluded (as did the NTSB) that this second debris was possible. They reported the debris was found in New Baltimore, 8 miles southeast; they even gave it a 9 knots wind which would be at 10.4 mph making this a 46 minute travel from Shanksville. What they found was “paper and thin nylon.”



Saeed Al-Ghamdi
(Reported still alive)



A. Al Haznawi



Ahmed Alnami
(Reported still alive)



Ziad Samir Jarrah
(Doubts if he is dead)

Boston Globe: “This does not make sense,” said his uncle, Jamal Jarrah, in a telephone interview from the village of Al-Marj, Lebanon, noting that two days before the attacks of his nephew, Ziad had called to say that the whole family would return home for the wedding of his cousin in mid-September.” He said he had even bought a new dress for the occasion.

The Guardian: “A farewell letter written by Ziad Jarrah to his girlfriend in Germany was intercepted by American investigators. Jarrah has sent to his girlfriend in Bochum, but apparently never came because of an error in address. The German postal service has returned the letter to the United States, where it was intercepted by investigators a week ago.”

BBC: “The letter was fabricated in an attempt to find evidence of guilt against Ziad.” Said his uncle to the U.S. *Associated Press*. He also added that it is very suspicious that Ziad was wrong to write the address of his girlfriend. Ziad has known her for five years, and could never make a mistake like this (especially with a letter so important).

LA Times

FBI Chief Raises New Doubts Over Hijackers' Identities
September 21, 2001

Saeed Al-Ghamdi, a name used by one of the alleged hijackers on United Airlines Flight 93, the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania. A Saudi Arabian pilot, currently on a mission to Tunisia, has the same name. Ahmed Alnami, a name used by another suspected hijacker on Flight 93. A 33-year-old Saudi Arabian pilot with the same name is alive in Riyadh.

BBC

September 23, 2001

Meanwhile, *Asharq Al Awsat* newspaper, a London-based Arabic daily, says it has interviewed Saeed Al-Ghamdi. He was listed by the FBI as a hijacker in the United flight that crashed in Pennsylvania. FBI Director Robert Mueller acknowledged on Thursday that the identity of several of the suicide hijackers is in doubt.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

October 4, 2001

"It's impossible for us to believe anymore," said Taha Alghamdi, a salesman in Jeddah whose brother Saeed was mistakenly confused with another man by the same name who hijacked United Flight 93, which crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. "What sort of intelligence agency doesn't know that there are thousands of Saeed Al-Ghamdis in Saudi Arabia?" Alghamdi said. "It is like accusing Tom from New York." Like others, Al-Ghamdi said his family would be pursuing legal action against the U.S. government for defamation.

AMERICAN FREE PRESS

December 10, 2001

The *Orlando Sentinel* and the Saudi Embassy has confirmed that four of the five mentioned by Al-Faisal terrorists (ie, Saeed Al-Ghamdi, Mohand Al-Shehri, Abdul Aziz Alomari and Salem Al-Hazmi) are still alive and completely unrelated to the terrorist attacks carried out September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington.

WASHINGTON POST

24 September, 2001

The father of Al-Ghamdi said that the FBI photo spread does not portray his son. "There is no similarity between my son and the man in those photos," he said.

CNN.com - Hijacking suspect's family claims mistaken identity - September 18, 2001

50

in Afghanistan 18 months ago

The family, which is cooperating with Lebanese authorities, said Jarrah was a fun-loving young man and said it would have been impossible for Jarrah to have turned into an Islamic fundamentalist. They released home video of Jarrah to CNN, showing him celebrating at another couple's wedding.

Jarrah lived in Germany until June 2000, when he went to the Miami area and took flight instruction at two schools in southern Florida.

Jarrah recently had been reported as missing by his girlfriend, who lives in the western German city of Bochum, after she had not spoken to him for some time.

German authorities said Jarrah lived in Hamburg and Bochum and searched two apartments in those German cities.

At the Bochum apartment, investigators found a suitcase with documents relating to airlines and airplanes. They would not elaborate further.

-- CNN's Beirut Bureau Chief Brent Sadler and Berlin Bureau Chief Bettina Luscher contributed to this report.

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Cancel Date: 09/28/2005

Reason for Cancellation: Cancelled

Aircraft Registration prior to Deregistration

Name: UNITED AIR LINES INC
1200 E Algonquin Rd
Arlington Heights
Illinois, 60005-4712
Cook County

Airworthiness

Engine Manufacturer: P & W

Classification: Standard

Engine Model: PW2040

Category: Transport

A/W Date: 06/28/1996

- FAA Registry

Date of Accident: 11 September 2001

Airline: United Airlines

Aircraft: Boeing 757-222

Location: Somerset, Pennsylvania, USA

Registration: N591UA

Previous Registrations: ---

Flight Number: 93

Fatalities: 45:45

MSN: 28142

Line Number: 718

Engine Manufacturer: Pratt & Whitney

Engine Model: PW2037

Year of Delivery: 1996

Accident Description:

Jet A fuel: 48,700 lbs at time of take off

Whatever happened on Flight UA93, one fact is disputed, and that is the official theory of what really happened to this aircraft on September 11, 2001.

The Jerusalem Post
18 May, 2011

THE JERUSALEM POST
Israel's best-selling English daily and most-read English website

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Breaking News 13:57 Europe's E. coli outbreaks linked to Egyptian seeds

JPost.com > Headlines

United inadvertently revives 9/11 flight numbers

By REUTERS
06/18/2011 21:32

CHICAGO - [United Airlines](#) temporarily revived the flight numbers of two hijacked planes used in the Sept. 11 attacks but said on Wednesday the move was inadvertent and [they would](#) not be used.

"We are taking immediate steps to remove them and apologize for the error," a United spokesman said.

Call numbers 93 and 175 were mistakenly assigned to two [flights](#) by Continental Airlines, which has merged with United.

United declined to explain how the numbers found their way back onto flights. Unionized flight attendants urged the company to permanently retire them, while pilots said the move was insensitive.

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Israel should retain settlements as a deterrence strategy
By RAPHAEL ISRAELI

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*Fair Use: For more information see footnote. ⁸

⁸ [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml]

Pittsburgh Tribune-Review

September 11, 2002






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Crash site cleanup cost \$850,000

By The Tribune-Review
Wednesday, September 11, 2002

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The state Department of Environmental Protection has approved the final cleanup report for the United Airlines Flight 93 crash site near Shanksville in Somerset County.

"United Airlines did a thorough job in its investigation of the environmental effects from the September 2001 plane crash," said Charles A. Duritsa, the DEP southwest regional director.

"Site samples indicate that the site meets Pennsylvania's Act 2 statewide health standards for soil and groundwater for the fuel known as jet "A" fuel. We consider cleanup work at the site completed."

Betsy Mallison, a DEP spokeswoman, said it cost United Airlines \$850,000 for the environmental investigation and remediation at the site of the crash in an old strip mine.

The site became a burial ground for 40 passengers and crew members who died after the jetliner was hijacked by four terrorists one year ago today.

United Airlines' site investigation included tests on samples of soil, sediment and groundwater in the immediate crash impact area, and also in the areas lying in the south and southeast corners of the site. The areas tested included a sediment pond drained during the FBI site investigation.


Soil sampling areas included the excavated pit, the area surrounding the pit and the backfill material.

"The backfill material was made up mostly of soil and dirt excavated from the pit during the criminal investigation," Duritsa said.

The material was in an area most likely to be contaminated by jet fuel, he said.

"Tests showed the area is considered safe," Duritsa added.

Soil sampling was conducted in a grid pattern and samples were collected down to 6 inches, according to the DEP. A geoprobe was used throughout the crash site to evaluate deeper impacts. Groundwater samples were collected from four monitoring wells installed in the zone.

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*The cost of the cleanup Flight UA93 created: \$850,000
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review (September 11, 2002).*

Among the two black boxes found from Flight UA93 was the Cockpit Voice Recorder; the recording which the families listened to ended at 10:02 a.m.



Flight UA93's Cockpit Voice Recorder

| United Flight 93 - Newark to San Francisco | |
|--|--|
| FAA Notification to NEADS | N/A ***** |
| Fighter Scramble: Order (Langley F-16s already airborne for AA Flt 77) | |
| Fighters Airborne (Langley F-16 CAP remains in place to protect DC) | |
| Airline Impact Time (Pennsylvania) | 1003 (estimated) |
| Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location | approx 11 min/100 miles (from DC F-16 CAP) |

NORAD Timeline

The following chart was given for the 9/11 Commission's perusal. It indicates the FAA had an approximate time of 10:04 a.m. when primary radar was lost of Flight UA93.

| | DoD | | | FAA |
|--------------|-------|------|--|--|
| | NORAD | CONR | NEAD | |
| 1004 | | | AICC Trans: 10:04:44 Huntress, Quit 25 that's , that's affirmative there's smoke coming from the Pentagon | 10:04:00 [time approximate] ZOB controller indicated that UAL93 primary radar terminated in vicinity of Somerset, Pennsylvania |
| 1005 1006 | | | ID Trans: 10:06:38 What we found out is that he is not a confirmed hijack [either Delta 89 or flight out of Canada] and that I don't even want to worry about that now, uh we got a United 93 out here and uh, are you aware of that uh, has a bomb on board. A bomb on board | |
| 1007 | | | MCC/T Log: Bomb on board UAL93 over Pittsburg | 10:07:00 In response to a request from a ZOB controller, N20VF, a Falcon Jet, reported observing puffs of smoke in vicinity of UAL93's last known position |
| 1007 | | | MCC OP Trans: 10:07:21-50 "Background" United 93, He's got a bomb, he's going where to where. "MCC" United 93, bomb on board, out of where, Boston....."MCC" Intercept and divert that aircraft away from there. "MCC" Okay we got, did you hear that, that aircraft over the White House, whats the word, intercept. | |
| 1007 | | | AICC Trans: 10:07:23-59 Baltimore is saying something about an aircraft over the White House, any worries. Negative, standby "SD2" did you copy that SD, center said there is an aircraft over the White House, any words "SD2" by center.. Quit 25 Huntress. Quit 25, mission is intercept aircraft over White House, use FAA for guidance. "Background" divert aircraft away from White House, intercept and divert. | |

The investigative summary (PENTTBOM 265A-NY-280350) of Flight UA93 published in April 19, 2002, shows how the hijack of “Flight #93 was initiated at 09:28 a.m., and terminated at 10:02 a.m., upon crashing into the ground at over 500 miles per hour.” The FBI, in their government exhibit at Zacarias Moussaoui’s trial of the flight transcript has 10:03:09 a.m. as the aircraft’s crash time.

Flight UA93 crash timeline

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 10:02 a.m. Flight Data Recording ends | FAA, PENTTBOM |
| 10:03 a.m. Aircraft crashed | FBI, NTSB, NORAD, NIST, 9/11 CR ⁹ |
| 10:04 a.m. Lost primary radar | FAA |
| 10:04 a.m. Plane is 15 miles south | Air Traffic Controller Dennis Fritz |
| 10:05 a.m. Plane flying low, erratic | Witness accounts |
| 10:06:05 a.m. Aircraft crashed | Seismic data |

The seismic data give another 3 minutes before Flight UA93 crashes as opposed to NORAD and NIST’s claim. And it is 3 minutes that “was unaccounted for” by FBI Director, Robert Mueller which is missing from the Cockpit Voice Recorder of Flight UA93. However, the FAA reports the Flight Data stopped recording at 10:02 a.m. So we have a gap from 10:02 a.m. when the recording stopped to 10:06:05 a.m. when the Seismic Data records the aircraft’s crash. Family members were anxious to hear if the other minutes missing from the tape could confirm the reports that the passengers had taken control of the plane. This however, has never been granted.

⁹ CR: Commission Report.

Mail: INBOX: US News piece

Page 1 of 2

40.12MB / 476.84MB (8.41%)

Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2003 22:23:11 -0400
From: "" <ckojm@9-11commission.gov>
To: "" <frontoffice@9-11commission.gov>
Subject: US News piece

*Air
Threat
Call*

To All: Found this; did anything show up in Time (I couldn't find it)?

Nation & World 9/8/03

Pieces of the Puzzle

A top-secret conference call on September 11 could shed new light on the terrorist attacks

By Chitra Ragavan and Mark Mazzetti

Not long after American Airlines Flight 11 slammed into the north tower of the World Trade Center, military officials in Washington initiated an "air-threat conference call." Through the course of the day, participants included Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and senior officials from the National Security Council (NSC), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Pentagon officials familiar with the events say the conference call was broadcast over a loudspeaker inside the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, which Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were using as an emergency command post.

Back in May, members of the independent commission appointed to examine the September 11 attacks were informed that the conference call had been recorded. But Pentagon officials said that they had yet to transcribe the tapes. The commission's repeated requests over the summer finally resulted in the Pentagon's creating a classified transcript. It was forwarded to the White House on August 6, U.S. News has learned, so that administration officials could conduct an "executive-privilege review," required because of Cheney's participation in the call. The commission has been promised access to the roughly 200-page transcript, sources say. Staff Director Philip Zelikow says the transcript is just a small piece of a mammoth puzzle the commission must put together by next May from thousands of pages of government documents. "We already had the substance," Zelikow says. "This is further detail, further corroboration." Commissioners say they may have to obtain the tapes themselves because the transcript is not time coded, making the task of outlining the exact sequence of events that day cumbersome.

Among the other highly classified materials recently presented to the commission: thousands of pages of transcripts of interrogations of top-tier al Qaeda leaders captured abroad and lower-level operatives held at the U.S. military barracks in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Commissioners hope the transcript of the September 11 conference call is revealing on several fronts. On the morning of the terrorist attacks, NORAD's satellites, operated to detect potential airborne attacks from outside U.S. borders, were unable to monitor the airspace inside the country. The command, buried in a mountain in Colorado Springs, Colo., was dependent on radars operated by the Federal Aviation Administration for information about the four fuel-heavy aircraft hijacked by the terrorists. NORAD even had to rely on FAA satellites to track military jets inside U.S. airspace, officials say. The transcript could help explain why it took the FAA 14 minutes to notify NORAD that American Airlines Flight 77--originally bound for Los Angeles from Washington's Dulles International Airport, but way off course over West Virginia--had been hijacked and was headed back toward Washington. Could the military, in those 14 minutes, have scrambled fighter jets and diverted the plane before it slammed into the Pentagon?

Shoot-down order. The transcript may also shed light on the military's response

to President Bush's unprecedented order to shoot down any hijacked civilian airplane. Pentagon sources say Bush communicated the order to Cheney almost immediately after Flight 77 hit the Pentagon and the FAA, for the first time ever, ordered all domestic flights grounded. "There are unanswered questions," says Richard Ben-Veniste, a commission member and former federal prosecutor, as to whether the shoot-down order "had been rehearsed for, whether it had been prepared for, and what measures were in place to protect the Capitol," believed to be the hijackers' original target for Flight 77.

Some of the questions may be raised in the commission's second interim report, due out in about two weeks. The report will offer a substantive summary of the commission's top priorities and offer an updated report card on agency cooperation. In its first interim report in July, the commissioners publicly chastised the Pentagon, FBI, CIA, and other agencies for recalcitrance. "Certainly, cooperation has improved," says Timothy Roemer, a commissioner. "But we're still seeking very critical documents from NORAD, NSC, and CIA."

With Anne Bradley

9/11 Commission Files

The NTSB transcript which follows states the model of the Flight Data Recorder being an "Allied Signal SSFDR." But this turns out not to be true. The images from the Flight Data Recorder taken at the crash site, clearly indicates "Honeywell" as manufacturer.



*Flight Data Recorder from crash site of Flight UA93
Should be an "A" for Allied Signal not "H" for Honeywell*

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Vehicle Recorders Division
Washington, D.C. 20594

February 15, 2002

Specialist's Factual Report of Investigation
Digital Flight Data Recorder

NTSB Number:
DCA01MA065

A. EVENT

Location: **Shanksville, Pennsylvania**
Date: **September 11, 2001**
Aircraft: **B-757-200, N591UA**
Operator: **United Airlines**

B. GROUP

N/A

C. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

In support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) investigation into the terrorist act of **United Airlines Flight 93**, which crashed in **Shanksville, Pennsylvania**, on September 11, 2001, the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Division received the following solid state flight data recorder (SSFDR) on September 13, 2001:

Recorder Manufacturer/Model: **Allied Signal SSFDR**

The SSFDR was examined upon receipt. The recorder displayed evidence of impact damage (figure 1). The memory board was removed and also showed signs of impact damage (figure 2).





U.S. Department of
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Office of the Secretary
of Transportation

The Inspector General

Office of Inspector General
Washington, D.C. 20590

FAA

May 5, 2004


The Honorable Thomas H. Kean
Chairman
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States
301 Seventh Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407

Dear Governor Kean:

Enclosed is a copy of our report to Senator John McCain, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, which we transmitted on May 4, 2004.

As requested by Senator McCain, we investigated (a) FAA's reported lack of responsiveness in providing the Commission with requested documents and materials, prompting the Commission to issue a subpoena for records on October 16, 2003; and (b) a specific allegation, initially identified by the Commission staff, that FAA had destroyed an audiotape that had been made at its New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (New York Center) of controller accounts of their actions and observations on September 11, 2001, shortly following the attacks. The Commission had learned of the tape, and its alleged destruction, during its interviews of New York Center personnel between September and October 2003.

Our investigative findings and recommendations concerning the alleged destruction of the audiotape are detailed in our report to Chairman McCain. In brief, we found that shortly before noon on September 11, the Center Manager directed the audiotaping of controllers' statements regarding their actions and observations that morning about the hijacked aircraft. We identified six controllers who gave tape-recorded statements, and determined that their statements were recorded on a single audiotape. We further found that the Center's then-Quality Assurance Manager--of his own volition and without consulting anyone--destroyed the tape, out of his personal concern that the tape never should have been made, because he considered it contrary to FAA policy and felt the controllers were not in the correct frame of mind to have properly consented to the taping. The Quality Assurance Manager told us that sometime



Organizational chart representing the division of tasks among the AFDIL staff.

The Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL) in Rockville, Maryland came out with an identification report on the victim remains of September 11, 2001. The report was titled “Naming the Dead - Confronting the Realities of Rapid Identification of Degraded Skeletal Remains” and was written by S.M. Edson, J.P. Ross, M.D. Coble, T.J. Parsons, and S.M. Barritt, according to the *Forensic Science Review*.¹⁰

In their report, as the DNA laboratory for the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System, and the contract they have with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), being a partner with the Disaster Mortuary Operations Response Team (DMORT), they worked “to identify the victims and the terrorists from the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Pentagon and at Shanksville, PA. During this mission, the personnel and laboratory structure of AFDIL were completely reorganized for six weeks, and the entire staff worked seven days a week to lay these victims of terrorism to rest. As a result, remains were identified quickly and efficiently and returned to the families in as short a time as possible.”

Regarding Flight UA93, the report concluded the following: “Four nonmatching nuclear DNA profiles were also obtained from the crash site and again tentatively ascribed to the terrorists.” It is not clear if actual identification was ever made, since three of the four alleged hijackers have been claimed as being still alive. Further into the report it states: “Mitochondrial DNA testing was also performed on the four putative terrorists from the UA flight 93/Shanksville, PA crash. None of the terrorist sequences matched any sequences in either the global forensic database or the Near Eastern database. Lacking matching sequences in any population database, we sought

¹⁰ *Forensic Science Review*, Vol. Sixteen, Number One (January 2004).

to access the phylogenetic information inherent in the mtDNA sequences to determine if that could suggest additional information as to their origin.” The report does not state its final results in this additional testing.

We now go into a brief analysis of the alleged hijackers’ timeline. Two timelines and an FAA Staff Report will be used in this section. The first timeline is the FBI’s “Hijackers Timeline (REDACTED)” published in February 1, 2007, and classified by “60324. AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW. Reason 1.4C.”¹¹ This timeline has been put together in chronological order, however, tends to confuse since all persons are added under a particular year. The second timeline issued by the 9/11 Commission reports each hijacker in chronological order. Many gaps from the FBI’s “Hijackers Timeline (REDACTED)” will be filled in by the 9/11 Commission Timeline. Finally, an FAA Staff Report will be followed to summarize the final days (September 10 and 11). This report was published in August 26, 2004.

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Profiles of 9/11 Saudi Hijackers Revealed
(WASHINGTON DC) September 11, 2002
The following has been compiled from articles in Saudi newspapers, and hijacker's friends.

- **Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Haznawi** (AlGhamdi) 24, from Beljurashi in AlBaha region. He left the kingdom in March 2000 the returned to the Kingdom December 2000, where he obtained a visa to the United States and met with his family. Ahmad called his mother in August from United States but told his mother he was in Chechnya. He was a student at the religious university Um Alqura in Makka for only two months before he was recruited to join Ben Laden's network, and dropped out to travel to Khandhar, Afghanistan. 24, from Beljurashi. He then returned to the kingdom before his travel to USA. He is unmarried, and belongs to the tribe of Ghamid. His father is the imam of a major mosque in Beljurashi. He is believed to be second in command. He was on board United Airlines #93 that crashed in Stony Creek Township.

- **Saeed AlGhamdi**: No information is available on him yet. It's believed that he is from Abha and friend of AlShehri brothers. He was on board United Airlines #93 that crashed in Stony Creek Township.

AlGhamdi tribe is one of the famous tribes in the Kingdom. It's concentrated in the southern region of the country. They number in hundreds of thousands of people. The tribe included several branches such as Haznah.

- **Ahmed Abdullah AlNami**: 23 from Abha he left the Kingdom 15 months ago after he was recruited to fight with Chechens to drive Russians out. He was a student the Abha branch of Imam Mohamed Ben Saud University the main religious university in the country. His family received the last call from him in June 2001 at the same time Hamza AlGhamdi called his family. He was imam of the mosque in his district in the southern city of Abha. He was trained in Khandahar, Afghanistan, and was stationed at the Khandahar airport. He traveled to the USA via Dubai. He was on board United Airlines #93 that crashed in Stony Creek Township.

Most if not all the suspects were trained in Khandhar, Afghanistan. Some of their training was shown in the famous Ben Laden videotape that was widely distributed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia this summer. The tape showed masked men training on variety of military tactics used for assassinations, bombings and other non-conventional military skills. It's believed that some of the US attackers were shown on the tape.

Most of the attackers were students in government religious schools and universities. The mostly belong to the southern regions of AlBaha and Aseer, two of the most deprived areas in Saudi Arabia. Discrimination against that region is rampant in government allocations and projects.

Ben Laden supporters in the kingdom have been arrested but released quickly because many are relatives of Saudi officials.

1900 L Street, N.W. Suite No. 309, Washington, D.C. 20036 Phone : 202-466-2300 editor@arabianews.org

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¹¹ Will be declassified officially in February 1, 2032.

9/11 Working-level Employee

The Hijackers and Their Visas

| Last Name | First Name | DOB | POB | DOI | POI | Consul | Supervi |
|------------|-----------------|----------|---------|----------|-----------|--------|---------|
| Al-Ghamdi | Ahmed Saleh | 7/2/79 | SARB | 9/3/00 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Ghamdi | Hamza | 11/18/80 | SARB | 10/17/00 | Riyadh | | |
| Al-Ghamdi | Saeed | 11/21/79 | SARB | 9/4/00 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Ghamdi | Saeed | 11/21/79 | SARB | 6/12/01 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Hazmi | Nawaf | 8/9/76 | SARB | 4/3/99 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Hazmi | Salem | 2/2/81 | SARB | 6/20/01 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Haznawi | Ahmad | 11/11/80 | SARB | 11/12/00 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Mihdhar | Khalid | 5/16/75 | SARB | 4/7/99 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Mihdhar | Khalid | 5/16/75 | SARB | 6/13/01 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Nami | Ahmad | 12/7/77 | SARB | 10/28/00 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Nami | Ahmad | 12/7/77 | SARB | 4/23/01 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Omari | Abdul Aziz | 5/28/79 | SARB | 6/18/01 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Shehhi | Marwan Yousef | 5/9/78 | UAE | 1/18/00 | Dubai | | |
| Al-Shehri | Mohand | 5/7/79 | SARB | 10/23/00 | Riyadh | | |
| Al-Shehri | Wail Mohammad | 7/31/73 | SARB | 10/24/00 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Shehri | Waleed Mohammad | 12/20/78 | SARB | 10/24/00 | Jeddah | | |
| Al-Suqami | Satam | 6/28/76 | SARB | 11/21/00 | Riyadh | | |
| Atta | Mohamed | 9/1/68 | Egypt | 5/18/00 | Berlin | | |
| Banihammad | Fayez Rashid | 3/19/77 | UAE | 6/18/01 | Abu Dhabi | | |
| Hanjour | Hani | 8/30/72 | SARB | 11/2/97 | Jeddah | | |
| Hanjour | Hani | 8/30/72 | SARB | 9/25/00 | Jeddah | | |
| Jarrah | Ziad Samir | 5/11/75 | Lebanon | 5/25/00 | Berlin | | |
| Moqed | Majed | 6/18/77 | SARB | 11/20/00 | Riyadh | | |

A line in italics represents the first of two visas

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9/11 Commission Timeline of alleged U.S. Visas issued

All alleged hijackers boarding Flight UA93 were not captured on CCTV security; the claim of their boarding was by the airline company. According to the FBI, or in this case airline personnel, Ziad Samir Jarrah, believed to be the pilot, and Saeed al-Ghamdi did not check any luggage or baggage when they went through checkpoint security. In both timelines there is a recorded room charge of \$3 and 18 cents to Jarrah's paid bill at the Marriott; no further details are given.

According to the FAA Staff Report published in August 26, 2004, "Only Ahmed al-Haznawi was selected by CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane after confirmation that Haznawi was on board." It is not certain what this comment actually signifies. If al-Haznawi was actually carrying some artifact in his bag that looked like explosives, then the bag was cleared and put on the flight where all bags are placed underneath the aircraft since Haznawi was already on board the aircraft. He was screened, most probably, though we do not have this on CCTV.

Taking into account that Haznawi was suspected of carrying explosives is not a light comment to state, especially coming from the FAA. This would mean that either they created this story which later turned into a rumour that a bomb was on board Flight UA93, or Haznawi actually did raise suspicions of carrying explosives which he triggered by some mechanism on his person when the aircraft was in the air, and the explosives went off in the bag underneath the aircraft. This would definitely corroborate the account given earlier from reporter Rick Earle (ABC) stating he spoke with a 911 operator in Greensburgh and about 09:58 a.m. the 911 emergency center received a cellular call from a man claiming to be a passenger on board Flight UA93. The caller told the operator the plane was being hijacked, and then relayed there had been an explosion on the aircraft, he saw a cloud of white smoke, and then the line went dead.

When a bag is screened for explosives, then the person the bag is owned by is held back from boarding until the proper authorities clear him. This is standard universal aviation safety rules regardless which airline the suspect is travelling on.

Still coming from the FAA Staff Report, note what is said regarding CCTV. “Because Newark Airport, like Logan in Boston, did not use video cameras to monitor activities at security checkpoints, we could not establish with certainty how the five hijackers were processed when they passed through security screening.” Note the FAA says “five hijackers” as opposed to four hijackers on Flight UA93 from the FBI. Once again, this flight is packed to the brim with discrepancies and inconsistencies.

The FAA Staff Report clearly states Newark Liberty Airport security selected Ahmed al-Haznawi to be “screened for explosives;” now let us read what *ABC* reported happened to Nawaf al-Hazmi as he went through security at Washington Dulles Airport where Flight AA77 was alleged to have taken off from and involved in the Pentagon attack.



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WASHINGTON July 21, 2004

•Surveillance video from Washington's Dulles Airport the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, shows four of the five hijackers being pulled aside to undergo additional scrutiny after setting off metal detectors but then permitted to board the fateful flight that later crashed into the Pentagon.

The surveillance video, obtained by The Associated Press, shows an airport screener hand-checking the carryon baggage of one hijacker, **Nawaf al-Hazmi, for traces of explosives** before letting him continue onto American Airlines Flight 77 with his brother, Salem, a fellow hijacker.

ADVERTISEMENT The disclosure of the video comes one day before the release of the final report by the Sept. 11 commission, which is expected to include a detailed accounting of the events that day.

Details in the grainy video are difficult to distinguish. But an earlier report by the commission is consistent with the men's procession through airport security as shown on the video obtained by the AP.

No knives or other sharp objects are visible on the surveillance video. But investigators on the commission have said the hijackers at Dulles were believed to be carrying utility knives either personally or in their luggage, which at the time could legally be carried aboard planes.

The video shows hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, each dressed conservatively in slacks and collared shirts, setting off metal-detectors as they pass through security. Moqed set off a second alarm, and a screener manually checked him with a handheld metal detector.

The pair were known to travel together previously and had paid cash to purchase their tickets aboard Flight 77 on Sept. 5, 2001, at the American Airlines counter at Baltimore's airport.

Only Hani Hanjour, believed to have been the hijacker who piloted Flight 77, did not set off a metal detector as he passed through Dulles security that morning, according to the video.

The AP obtained the video from the Motley Rice law firm, which is representing some survivors' families who are suing the airlines and security industry over their actions in the Sept. 11 attacks.

On the Net:

FBI information about Flight 77: www.fbi.gov/pressrel/penttbom/aa77/77.htm

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We have two separate planes where two different alleged hijackers were screened for explosives. One aircraft belonged to American Airlines and another to United Airlines. Both airline company securities had the obligation to detain these passengers and/or alleged hijackers until the appropriate authority cleared them.

The FAA Staff Report also tells us that "On Flight 93, the cockpit key was kept in a storage compartment in the front of the airplane. It was United Air Lines' policy at the time not to provide individual flight attendants with a key to the cockpit door." As passengers aboard some flight, on any aircraft, have no inside knowledge of these details, a question could be posed: How did the alleged hijackers know where the key was stored to open the cockpit door? The following is again from this same report.

09:28 a.m.

The aircraft was traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio. It suddenly began to descend, dropping 685 feet over the next half minute. Eleven seconds into the descent, Cleveland Center overheard the first of two radio transmissions from the Flight 93 cockpit. The captain or first officer declared “Mayday” amid sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. While the controller did not understand what was said, he began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions and noticed Flight 93’s rapid descent. The Cleveland controller replied over the radio: “Somebody call Cleveland?” There was no reply.

The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the clash was still in progress. The captain or first officer shouted: “Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here.” The screaming in this second radio transmission was heard by the Cleveland controller responsible for Flight 93.

While this appears to show the exact time that the hijackers invaded the cockpit, we have found no conclusive evidence to indicate precisely when the terrorists took over the main cabin or moved passengers seated in the first-class cabin back to coach-a tactic reported by several passengers during phone calls to parties on the ground. They waited approximately 46 minutes after takeoff to begin their assault. We were unable to determine why they waited so long.

END OF EXTRACT

But the above report turns out not to be true: One of the passengers on board Flight UA93 called his wife, Deena Burnett, who clearly tells how her husband told her that one of the hijackers “had a gun.” This call was made 2 minutes after the aircraft was in the air.

Two reports from passengers that firearm was on board two hijacked flights (UA93 and AA11); two prior screenings of alleged hijackers suspicious of carrying explosives onto these identical flights, tells us this is a pattern. Again, this has never even been touched by the mainstream media. We do not know if the FBI ever looked into these two serious and important airline security breaches.

In the Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation for 2001 report, released by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), they note how “one of the hijackers on board UAL flight 93 also claimed to have a bomb strapped to his body, but the passengers apparently did not believe him, and no evidence of a bomb explosion was found.” Assuming the report was referring to the crash site in Pennsylvania, no debris from Flight UA93 was found to have been credential enough for a National Transportation Security Board (NTSB) crash investigation to be conducted; therefore, the conclusions of the TSA report that “no evidence of a bomb explosion was found,” cannot be substantiated by an investigation from the NTSB, for the simple reason there never was an investigation.

The 9/11 Commission Report states that although the FAA was aware that Flight UA93 had been hijacked at 09:30 a.m. they violated their guidelines and never reported the hijacking to the military, and no jets were scrambled to the area. The Commission Report indicates that bridge

calls between the FAA, NMCC, and other parties did not begin until 09:30 a.m. The Commission Report indicates that Cheney did not arrive at the White House PEOC center until 09:58 a.m. and gave the order to shoot down the plane well after the plane had crashed and due to a false report at 10:10 a.m. by FAA that the plane was still heading for the White House.

This time which the 9/11 Commission appears to have adopted is a timeline to counter the widespread suggestions that the military shot down Flight UA93. But the Commission Report and timeline is contradicted by a huge body of testimony and reports; neither does their report mention any evidence given in this paper.